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COMMENT 
NCAA Division I Transfers “are now 
basically screwed”1 
The Battle Against the NCAA’s Year in Residence Rule 
in the Seventh Circuit 
 
JOSEPH W. SCHAFER† 
INTRODUCTION 
Most National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) 
bylaws have enjoyed over thirty years of antitrust protection 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act—it is time for this era to 
end. Bylaws are the backbone of the NCAA’s model: they hold 
each member institution and its actors to the same standards 
of conduct, academic eligibility, recruiting, and playing and 
practice seasons to attempt to establish an even playing field 
among competitors.2 In 1984, the Supreme Court reasoned 
 
 1. Gary Parrish, The NCAA’s new policy on transfers has one bad unintended 
consequence, CBS SPORTS (Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.cbssports.com/college-
basketball/news/the-ncaas-new-policy-on-transfers-has-one-bad-unintended-
consequence. 
† J.D. Candidate, 2018, University at Buffalo School of Law. The author is a 
former Division I athlete and assistant coach at Davidson College. The author 
would like to thank Professor Bridget Niland for the inspiration to write this 
Comment, Professor Helen Drew for her mentorship and direction in the 
constantly evolving legal landscape facing the NCAA, and Professor Christine 
Bartholomew for her invaluable insight, edits and suggestions. A special thanks 
is due to the entire team at the Buffalo Law Review, especially Christian Cassara, 
for the tireless hours spent making this Comment ready for publication. 
 2. See NCAA CONST. art II, §§ 2.1–2.16. 
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in NCAA v. Board of Regents3 that most NCAA bylaws were 
presumptively procompetitive under antitrust law because 
cooperation among competitor schools was necessary to 
establish basic standards for intercollegiate competition, and 
therefore the NCAA deserved ample latitude to set these 
standards through its bylaws.4 
At the time the case was decided, the myth of the 
student-athlete5 was alive and well. In 1984, the NCAA did 
not enjoy billion-dollar TV contracts, had not yet encountered 
a two decade-long academic fraud scandal at one of its most 
decorated institutions, and Division I basketball had not 
been investigated by the FBI for conspiracy, bribery, and 
fraud in a pay-for-play scheme in which coaches used six-
figure cash payments to secure the nation’s top recruits. 
Instead, this describes the NCAA of 2018, whose bylaws do 
not deserve the same antitrust protection. 
Since 1984, Board of Regents has enabled the NCAA to 
defeat numerous legal challenges to its governance system.6 
However, in September 2015, the Ninth Circuit broke away 
from the deference granted to NCAA Bylaws in O’Bannon v. 
NCAA, holding that certain NCAA amateurism bylaws 
violated the Sherman Act.7 By applying the Rule of Reason 
to these bylaws, the Ninth Circuit opened the NCAA’s 
amateur sports model to antitrust attack. 
This Comment focuses on one of the resulting attacks: an 
antitrust challenge to Bylaw 14.5.5.1, the Year in Residence 
Rule. This rule mandates that any student-athlete who plays 
 
 3. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 4. Id. at 120. 
 5. Gary Gutting, The Myth of the ‘Student-Athlete’, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 
2012), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/the-mthy-of-the-student
-athlete. 
 6. See, e.g., Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. NCAA, 751 F.3d 368, 379 (5th Cir. 
2014); Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1094 (7th Cir. 1992); McCormack v. 
NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 7. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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a revenue-generating sport (baseball, basketball, bowl 
subdivision football, or men’s ice hockey) and subsequently 
transfers to a new institution must complete a full academic 
year (two semesters or three quarters) at the new school8 
before participating in NCAA-sanctioned competition.9 The 
rule seeks to ensure student-athletes are adequately 
situated at their new institution before balancing the 
pressures of competing in Division I intercollegiate 
competition. The rule also seeks to prevent free agency. 
In writing, the Year in Residence Rule helps further the 
NCAA’s objectives of interscholastic sports, but in practice it 
is problematic. As coaches continue to chase prestigious jobs 
and huge contracts, student-athletes have become 
expendable. Four-year scholarship promises are easily 
broken when student-athletes could cost coaches 
opportunities for a contract extension or a big payday. When 
coaches seeking a big payday choose not to renew 
scholarships, student-athletes are penalized if they seek to 
transfer to another Division I school because they must fulfill 
an entire academic year in residence before competing for 
their new school even if they are in good academic standing 
at their current institution. 
To make matters worse, Division I schools want players 
who can compete immediately and often offer scholarships to 
transfers if the student-athletes can successfully petition the 
NCAA to waive the requirement (which happens rarely, if 
ever). Consequently, to be able to play immediately, these 
student-athletes are forced make a sacrifice athletically and 
financially. Within the NCAA bylaws there are only two 
realistic ways to transfer to be academically eligible to play 
upon arriving at the new campus. A student-athlete can 
 
 8. In this Comment, “school” and “institution” are used interchangeably to 
refer to colleges and universities. 
 9. NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL: AUGUST 2016–17 § 14.5.5.1 (2016), 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4435-2016-2017-ncaa-division-i-manual-
august-version-available-august-2016.aspx [hereinafter NCAA DIVISION I 
MANUAL]. 
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transfer to a Division II school where the grant in aid 
packages provide less financial support and the level of 
competition is significantly lower.10 Or, in the alternative, if 
the student-athlete is a football player with two or more 
years of eligibility left, he can transfer from an FBS to a 
FCS11 school, which again is a marked decrease in the 
quality of competition.12 So, the Year in Residence Rule 
essentially functions to deprive the market of its best players 
because teams pass on student-athletes who would otherwise 
be given roster spots but for having to fulfill the year in 
residence. 
In just over twelve months, starting in November 2015, 
Hagens Berman filed three class-action lawsuits against the 
NCAA challenging the Year in Residence Rule under the 
Sherman Act. Two cases, Pugh v. NCAA13 and Deppe v. 
NCAA14 were decided in the NCAA’s favor.15 However, the 
Seventh Circuit granted the plaintiff’s appeal in Deppe, and 
 
 10. Transfer Terms, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/current/
transfer-terms (last visited Feb. 23, 2018). 
 11. Although there are numerous differences in FBS (Football Bowl 
Subdivision) and FCS (Football Championship Subdivision) schools, which are 
outlined in section 17.10 of the NCAA Division I Manual, the chief difference 
between the two subdivisions is the amount of aid the programs can give. FBS 
schools are mainly Power Five Conference (ACC, Big 10, Big 12, PAC 12, SEC) 
schools that are consistently seen on television every Saturday in the fall and 
ultimately compete for a spot in the College Football Playoff. These schools can 
offer up to eighty-five full grant-in-aid scholarships. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, 
supra note 9, at § 15.5.6.1. FCS schools are lesser known schools, commonly of 
“mid-major” level. These schools are also allowed to award eighty-five 
scholarships to student-athletes, but only sixty-three student-athletes may be 
awarded full grant-in-aid scholarships. Id. § 15.5.6.2. 
 12. NCAA ELIGIBILITY CENTER, 2017–18 GUIDE FOR FOUR-YEAR TRANSFERS 
FOR STUDENT-ATHLETES AT FOUR-YEAR COLLEGES 17–18 (2017), 
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2017-18_Transfer_Guide_4_Year_201707
21.pdf. 
 13. No. 1:15-cv-01747-TWP-DKL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168174 (S.D. Ind. 
Sep. 27, 2016). 
 14. No. 1:16-cv-00528-TWD-DKL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31704 (S.D. Ind. 
Mar. 6, 2017). 
 15. Id. at *12; Pugh, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168174, at *11. 
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heard oral arguments in September 2017.16 As of April 2018, 
the court has not yet issued its decision.17 In the last case, 
Vassar v. NCAA,18 the parties agreed to await the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Deppe, which will likely determine its 
outcome.19 
In light of the current state of the NCAA, which has come 
to be defined by money, power, and scandal, coupled with the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding in O’Bannon, the Seventh Circuit 
should follow its sister circuit’s lead and analyze Bylaw 
14.5.5.1 under the Rule of Reason. Deppe presents a unique 
opportunity to institute much needed reform of an 
organization whose president has recognized needs 
“fundamental change.”20 The realities of today’s NCAA 
clearly demonstrate that the organization no longer 
warrants the antitrust protection it has been afforded. More 
importantly, Deppe is a chance to do right by the group of 
individuals the NCAA would be nothing without—the 
student-athletes. 
This Comment demonstrates the importance of the first 
antitrust challenge to the NCAA after O’Bannon. Part I 
provides a realistic overview of the current vulnerability of 
the NCAA due to certain elements of unfairness to student-
athletes in its model. Part II delves into the jurisprudential 
background that enabled NCAA bylaws to pass antitrust 
scrutiny for over thirty years, and how O’Bannon seeks to 
break that trend. Part III analyzes how and why Pugh and 
Deppe were held in favor of the NCAA. Part IV demonstrates 
 
 16. Oral Argument, Deppe v. NCAA, No. 17-1711 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2017), 
https://player.fm/series/oral-arguments-for-the-court-of-appeals-for-the-seventh-
circuit/peter-deppe-v-ncaa. 
 17. Deppe v. NCAA, No. 17-1711 (7th Cir. filed Apr. 6, 2017). 
 18. No. 1:16-CV-10590 (N.D. Ill. filed Nov. 14, 2016). 
 19. See id. 
 20. Will Hobson, NCAA President Mark Emmert: ‘Fundamental change’ 
needed in college basketball, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2017), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2017/ncaa-president-mark-
emmert-fundamental-change-needed-in-college-basketball. 
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the harms that could result in the NCAA’s transfer 
environment if the Seventh Circuit affirms Deppe, by setting 
forth the facts in Vassar. Part V concludes by applying the 
Rule of Reason to the Year in Residence Rule, as it suggests 
the Seventh Circuit should do in Deppe. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The NCAA 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association was 
founded in 190621 to govern intercollegiate athletics in the 
 
 21. The NCAA was founded as a direct result of President Theodore 
Roosevelt’s call to end brutality in college football. National Collegiate Athletic 
Association, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/
National-Collegiate-Athletic-Association (last visited Mar. 27, 2018). Organized 
college football similar to today’s version of football began in the United States in 
the 1880s. See JOHN SAYLE WATTERSON, COLLEGE FOOTBALL: HISTORY, SPECTACLE, 
CONTROVERSY 19–21 (2000). By the mid-1890s, Harvard, Yale, and Princeton 
developed heated football rivalries that attracted nationwide attention. Id. at 10. 
By the turn of the century, the game spread in popularity as these rivalries grew, 
games turned more violent, and injury, including death, became more frequent. 
Id. at 58–59. In October of 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt met with 
Secretary of State, Elihu Root, Yale’s chief athletic adviser and football coach, 
Walter Camp and Jack Owsley, William T. Reid, head football coach, and Dr. 
D.H. Nichols of Harvard, and football coaches, Arthur T. Hillebrand and John B. 
Fine, from Princeton, to discuss college football rule reform. According to a 
Washington Post article, 
[the] President wished to have an interchange of views with the object 
of devising means of eliminating so far as possible the brutal elements 
of football. President Roosevelt is especially desirous that the great 
American college game should not suffer through unsportsmanlike 
conduct of players who may willfully injure a member of an opposing 
team in the heat of contest. 
Hears Football Men: Coaches in Conference with President Roosevelt, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 10, 1905), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1175005-144576144-
1.html. The article continues, “[it] is hoped by the President that with the co-
operation of the college authorities and the athletic advisers the rules of the game 
may be so amended as practically to do away with much of the brutality which 
makes the game objectionable to many people. . . . [T]he idea of the President 
[was] simply to start the ball rolling in the direction of a modification of the rules 
of the game.” Id. Roosevelt, a Harvard alumnus and huge football fan, threatened 
to put an end to the entire system of college football if the universities could not 
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United States.22 From its inception to today, the NCAA has 
distinguished its product from professional sports by the 
unique characterization of its participants as “student-
athletes.”23 According to the NCAA Constitution, athletics 
are a fundamental element of the educational programs of its 
member universities.24 In order to participate in any practice 
or competition, all NCAA student-athletes must meet a 
minimum academic standard in the classroom.25 
Subsequently, the NCAA has been wildly successful in 
establishing itself as the governing body of nearly all college 
athletics in the United States.26 Today, almost 500,000 
student-athletes participate in NCAA-sanctioned 
 
control their players. George H. Hanford, Controversies in College Sports, 445 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 66, 68 (1979). As such, the NCAA was founded 
“to codify, promulgate, and enforce rules and regulations which would ensure 
proper behavior on and off the field.” Id. 
 22. EDWARD J. SHEA & ELTON E. WIEMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES FOR 
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 14 (1967). According to its first constitution, the 
NCAA was established to govern “the regulation and supervision of college 
athletics throughout the United States, in order that the athletic activities of the 
colleges and universities of the United States may be maintained on an ethical 
plane in keeping with the dignity and high purpose of education.” Id. For a 
discussion on the history of NCAA’s governance of intercollegiate athletics in the 
United States, see, for example, Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9 (2000). 
 23. Student-Athletes, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2018). 
 24. NCAA CONST. art I, § 1.3.1 (stating the purpose of the NCAA is “to 
maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program 
and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a 
clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional 
sports”). 
 25. Division I Academic Eligibility, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/
division-i-academic-eligibility/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2018). 
 26. The NCAA is comprised of over 1200 member schools, conferences, and 
organizations. Membership, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-
are/membership (last visited Feb. 24, 2018) [hereinafter Membership]. Between 
its three divisions, the NCAA supervises almost half a million student-athletes, 
who make up 19,500 teams that participate in 90 national championships in 
twenty-four sports. What is the NCAA?, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/
resources/media-center/ncaa-101/what-ncaa (last visited Feb. 24, 2018) 
[hereinafter What is the NCAA?]. 
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competition each year27 in the organization’s three divisions: 
Division I, Division II and Division III.28 The NCAA and its 
member institutions award $2.9 billion in scholarships 
annually to over 150,000 student-athletes.29 
B. Division I 
Division I athletics represent the highest level of 
intercollegiate athletics in the United States and are the 
most well-known nationally.30 The schools that make up the 
division have the most populous student bodies, finance the 
largest athletics budgets, offer the most amount of 
scholarship money to their student-athletes, and are given 
the most money by donors.31 Division I’s most popular and 
widely televised sports are FBS football32 and men’s 
basketball.33 Each sport’s most talented players are drafted 
 
 27. What is the NCAA?, supra note 26. 
 28. The chief difference between the three divisions is the amount of 
scholarship money that may be offered to student-athletes. Division I programs 
may offer grant-in-aid up to the cost of attendance (i.e. “full scholarships”). Cost 
of Attendance Q&A, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2015-09-
03/cost-attendance-qa (last visited Mar. 27, 2018). Division II schools offer mostly 
“partial” scholarships that combine athletic, academic, and financial aid 
packages. See About NCAA Division II, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/
about?division=d2 (last visited Feb. 24, 2018). Finally, Division III programs are 
prohibited from providing athletics aid to any student-athlete. Only athletes who 
can show financial need will receive tuition assistance. See Ronald J. 
Waicukauski, The Regulation of Academic Standards in Intercollegiate Athletics, 
in LAW & AMATEUR SPORTS 161, 162 (Ronald J. Waicukauski ed., 1982). 
 29. Finances, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2018). 
 30. Division I is the smallest of the three NCAA divisions by membership with 
about 350 institutions and 170,000 student-athletes. NCAA Division I, NCAA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=d1 (last visited Feb. 24, 2018). 
 31. See id.; see also discussion of Division I, supra note 21. 
 32. Division I football averages over two million viewers per game. See Emily 
Kaplan, Why Haven’t College Football Ratings Fallen Like the NFL’s?, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 16, 2016), http://mmqb.si.com/mmqb/2016/11/15/college-
football-ratings-2016-season-nfl-ratings-espn-fox-nfl-draft. 
 33. See Rob Goldberg, 2017 NCAA Tournament is Most Viewed in 24 Years, 
Ratings Up 10 Percent from 2016, BLEACHER REPORT (Mar. 20, 2017), 
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into professional leagues, and some commentators,34 
including one federal court,35 have labeled these two sports 
as the per se minor leagues for the NFL and NBA.36 As 
college athletics have morphed into a proving ground for 
future professional athletes, the NCAA’s governance 
structure, the Bylaws, have become a crucial line of 
demarcation to ensure the highest level of college athletics 
remain amateur. 
C. The Bylaws 
Each of the NCAA’s three divisions are governed by their 
own set of bylaws,37 which hold all member institutions to 
the same standards to ensure competitive balance and 




 34. For instance, in his introductory press conference as head coach of the 
Tennessee Titans, former NFL linebacker, Mike Vrabel, commented: “[t]he NFL 
has the greatest farm system in the world. We pay our farm-system coaches $10 
million to develop players. . . . [Alabama coach] Nick Saban is our farm system. 
[Ohio State coach] Urban Meyere is our farm system.” Richard Johnson, New 
Titans Coach Mike Vrabel said the thing everyone knows about college football, 
SB NATION (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.sbnation.com/college-
football/2018/1/23/16923966/mike-vrabel-nfl-college-football-minor-system. 
 35. See Hall v. Univ. of Mich., 530 F. Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1982) (“The 
exceptionally talented student athlete is led to perceive the basketball, football, 
and other athletic programs as farm teams and proving grounds for professional 
sports leagues. It well may be true that a good academic program for the athlete 
is made virtually impossible by the demands of their sport at the college level.”). 
 36. Tim MacMahon, Should NCAA Serve as NBA’s Minor League?, ESPN 
(June 24, 2015), http://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/13136578/should-ncaa-
serve-nba-minor-league; William C. Rhoden, NFL Crosses a Boundary in the 
Pryor Case, N.Y. TIMES: SPORTS OF THE TIMES (Aug. 21, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/22/sports/football/pryor-case-highlights-nfls-
uncomfortably-cozy-ties-with-ncaa.html. 
 37. Membership, supra note 26. 
 38. The NCAA’s Core Values state: “The Association—through its member 
institutions, conferences and national office staff—shares a belief in and 
commitment to: 
• The collegiate model of athletics in which students participate as an 
avocation, balancing their academic, social and athletics experiences. 
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admitted as an NCAA member, the institution agrees it will 
obey all bylaws and subject itself to discipline for any 
violations.39 Overall, the bylaws dictate standards for 
academic eligibility of student-athletes, amateurism 
restrictions, recruiting guidelines for coaches and players, 
financial aid limits and requirements, athletic department 
budgetary oversight, and playing and practice season hour 
requirements.40 These bylaws govern every student-athlete 
(current and prospective), coach, administrator, faculty 
member, and donor affiliated with each of its member 
institutions.41 With its current size and multibillion dollar 
revenues, institutional control and bylaw adherence are 
integral to the continued success of the NCAA, especially in 
Division I.42 
 
• The highest levels of integrity and sportsmanship. 
• The pursuit of excellence in both academics and athletics. 
• The supporting role that intercollegiate athletics plays in the higher 
education mission and in enhancing the sense of community and 
strengthening the identity of member institutions. 
• An inclusive culture that fosters equitable participation for student-
athletes and career opportunities for coaches and administrators from 
diverse backgrounds. 
• Respect for institutional autonomy and philosophical differences. 
• Presidential leadership of intercollegiate athletics at the campus, con-
ference and national levels.” 
NCAA Core Values, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/ncaa-core-values (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2018) (emphasis in original). 
 39. NCAA CONST. art. 1, § 1.3.2 (“Member institutions shall be obligated to 
apply and enforce this legislation, and the infractions process of the Association 
shall be applied to an institution when it fails to fulfill this obligation.”). 
 40. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 9, at iii-v. 
 41. See generally id. 
 42. See, e.g., Maureen A. Weston, Symposium Introduction: The New Normal 
in College Sports: Realigned and Reckoning, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 209, 216–17 (2014) 
(finding all symposium panelists agreed that “institutional control is a shared 
responsibility” that starts from the top down, where the “university president 
appoint[s] capable and ethical” athletic department leaders, an athletic director 
hires competent and responsible compliance officers, and the compliance officers 
then inform “administrators, coaches, student-athletes, boosters, alumni, and 
even fans to know and honor the rules and implement a monitoring system that 
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1. Article 14: Academic Eligibility 
Article 14 of the NCAA Division I Manual defines 
academic standards for incoming, currently enrolled, and 
transfer student-athletes.43 In essence, the academic 
eligibility bylaws set a minimum academic benchmark that 
every student-athlete at every NCAA institution must meet 
to be eligible for competition. These uniform standards seek 
to ensure future student-athletes are academically qualified 
when they arrive on campus, and current student-athletes 
are successfully balancing their coursework and athletic 
commitments. 
2. Bylaw 14.5.5.1, The Year in Residence Rule 
Section 14.5 of Article 14 governs the eligibility of 
transfer students.44 The section at issue in this Comment is 
 
results in compliance with those rules”). 
 43. The stated purpose of Bylaw 14 is “to ensure that the Division I 
membership is dedicated to providing student-athletes with exemplary 
educational and intercollegiate-athletics experiences in an environment that 
recognizes and supports the primacy of the academic mission of its member 
institutions, while enhancing the ability of male and female student-athletes to 
earn a four-year degree.” NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 9, at 143, § 
14.01.4. 
 44. Bylaw 14.5.2 defines a transfer student as: 
[A]n individual who transfers from a collegiate institution after having 
met any one of the following conditions at that institution: . . . (a) The 
student was officially registered and enrolled in a minimum, full-time 
program of studies in any quarter or semester of an academic year, as 
certified by the registrar or admissions office, provided the student was 
present at the institution on the opening day of classes; (b) The student 
attended a class or classes in any quarter or semester in which the stu-
dent was enrolled in a minimum full-time program of studies, even if the 
enrollment was on a provisional basis and the student was later deter-
mined by the institution not to be admissible; (c) The student is or was 
enrolled in an institution in a minimum full-time program of studies in 
a night school that is considered to have regular terms (semesters or 
quarters) the same as the institution’s day school, and the student is or 
was considered by the institution to be a regularly matriculated student; 
(d) The student attended a branch school that does not conduct an inter-
collegiate athletics program, but the student had been enrolled in an-
other collegiate institution prior to attendance at the branch school; (e) 
The student attended a branch school that conducted an intercollegiate 
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Bylaw 14.5.5.1, the “Year in Residence Rule.” The text of 
Bylaw 14.5.5.1, the rule for four-year college to four-year 
college (i.e. four-four) transfers, states: “[a] transfer student 
from a four-year institution shall not be eligible for 
intercollegiate competition at a member institution until the 
student has fulfilled a residence requirement of one full 
academic year (two full semesters or three full quarters) at 
the certifying institution.”45 The NCAA’s rationale behind 
the rule is that it “encourages [student-athletes] to make 
decisions motivated by academics as well as athletics. Most 
student-athletes who are not eligible to compete immediately 
benefit from a year to adjust to their new school and focus on 
their classes.”46 
Bylaw 14.5.5.1 attempts to prevent students from 
immediately competing, regardless of the reason for 
transferring.47 However, the student-athlete may petition 
 
athletics program and transfers to an institution other than the parent 
institution; (f) The student reported for a regular squad practice (includ-
ing practice or conditioning activities that occur prior to certification per 
Bylaws 14.3.5.1 and 14.5.4.6.7), announced by the institution through 
any member of its athletics department staff, prior to the beginning of 
any quarter or semester, as certified by the athletics director. Participa-
tion only in picture-day activities would not constitute “regular practice”; 
(g) The student participated in practice or competed in a given sport even 
though the student was enrolled in less than a minimum full-time pro-
gram of studies; or (h) The student received institutional financial aid 
while attending a summer term, summer school or summer-orientation 
program (see Bylaws 15.2.8.1.3 and 15.2.8.1.4). A recruited student who 
receives institutional aid pursuant to Bylaw 15.2.8.1.4 is subject to the 
transfer provisions, except that a prospective student-athlete (recruited 
or nonrecruited) who is denied admission to the institution for full-time 
enrollment shall be permitted to enroll at another institution without 
being considered a transfer student. 
Id. at 163–64, § 14.5.2. 
 45. Id. § 14.5.5.1. 
 46. Frequently Asked Questions About the NCAA, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org
/about/frequently-asked-questions-about-ncaa (last visited Feb. 25, 2018). 
 47. See id. Bylaw 14.7.2 notes four cases where the NCAA’s Subcommittee for 
Legislative Relief has the option to waive the year in residence: (1) when a 
student-athlete transfers schools for health reasons; (2) in the event eligibility 
was taken away from the student-athlete because of a violation of the prohibition 
on “pay for participation” and the student-athlete proves he is innocent; (3) when 
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the NCAA for a Section 12.8.4 hardship waiver to forego the 
year in residency if the student can demonstrate substantial 
adversity or other mitigating circumstances.48 Nevertheless, 
the NCAA has taken a hard line—especially in Division I 
football and men’s basketball—and almost never grants 
hardship waivers for transfers.49 
a) Bylaw 14.5.5.2.10: The One-Time Transfer Exception 
While Bylaw 14.5.5.1 appears broad at first glance, the 
NCAA has limited its reach. Bylaw 14.5.5.2.10, the “One-
Time Transfer Exception,” allows a student-athlete to be 
immediately eligible to participate in intercollegiate 
competition at a transfer institution if the student: 
(a) is a participant in a sport other than baseball, basketball, bowl 
subdivision football or men’s ice hockey . . . ; 
(b) has not previously transferred from a four-year institution . . . ; 
(c) would have been academically eligible had he or she remained 
at the institution from which the student transferred . . . ; 
(d) the student’s previous institution . . . certify[ies] in writing that 
it has no objection to the student being granted an exception to the 
transfer-residence requirement.50 
b) The True Function of the Year in Residence Rule 
The One-Time Transfer Exception shows the true 
rationale behind the Year in Residence Rule: the NCAA does 
not want free agency in its most popular and profitable 
 
a student-athlete transfers to a new school because his previous school is on 
probation for an NCAA infraction and the student-athlete will be prevented from 
competing in postseason competition for the rest of his years of eligibility; and (4) 
when a student-athlete transfers to a new school because his previous school is 
on probation for an NCAA academic sanction and the student-athlete will be 
prevented from competing in postseason competition for the rest of his years of 
eligibility. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 9, at 173–74, § 14.7.2. 
 48. See id. at 77–79, §12.8.4. 
 49. ROBERT C. BERRY & GLENN M. WONG, 2 LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE SPORTS 
INDUSTRIES: COMMON ISSUES IN AMATEUR AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 144, § 3.13 
(2d ed. 1993). 
 50. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 9, at 170, § 14.5.5.2.10 (emphasis 
added). 
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sports.51 By excluding revenue-generating sports from this 
one-time exception, it is clear the NCAA is concerned about 
its public relations image. Specifically, the organization 
appears concerned that its amateur model will not be as 
popular if players are allowed to freely transfer between 
schools. It would be a public relations nightmare to see a 
player on one football team in September and another in 
November, within the same academic semester. 
Consequently, the Year in Residence Rule functions to 
prevent the small percentage of Division I athletes who are 
NBA and NFL prospects from shopping teams to increase 
their draft stock. Yet only 1.1% of 18,684 men’s basketball 
players and 1.5% of 73,660 football players go on to compete 
professionally.52 Unfortunately, the remaining 98% of 
Division I football and basketball players are forced to abide 
by the same rules as the few who would go on to a 
professional career. So, for instance, if a student-athlete 
transfers to a new school to pursue a major her previous 
school did not offer, she must sit out one year. If a student-
athlete transfers due to a coaching change, where the new 
head coach chooses not to renew his scholarship, he will also 
be held from competition for one year. Finally, if a student-
athlete transfers because he has been verbally or physically 
abused by a coach,53 he will also be forced to sit out a year. 
c) Criticism of Bylaw 14.5.5.1 
Unsurprisingly, the rule has drawn criticism. For 
example, Gary Parrish of CBS Sports wrote in April 2015 
 
 51. Where a men’s tennis player can transfer from one Power Five team to 
another and not have to sit out a year if it is his first transfer, a football or men’s 
basketball player will have to fulfill this year in residence. 
 52. Estimated probability of competing in professional athletics, NCAA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/estimated-probability-competing-
professional-athletics (last visited Feb. 26, 2018). 
 53. See, e.g., Steve Eder & Kate Zernike, Rutgers Leaders Are Faulted on 
Abusive Coach, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/04/
sports/ncaabasketball/rutgers-fires-basketball-coach-after-video-surfaces.html. 
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“there’s a pretty terrible unintended consequence to the 
NCAA no longer allowing waivers for transfers to play 
immediately . . . [which] is this: [p]layers who are run off by 
their coaches are now basically screwed.”54 Parrish’s article 
goes on to quote one Power Five basketball coach, who chose 
to remain anonymous: “It’s wrong . . . . You’re telling me I 
can sign a kid, keep him for a year or two, decide I 
misevaluated him and pull his scholarship, and then that kid 
has to sit a year no matter what? That’s [expletive] up, man. 
That’s just [expletive] up.”55 
d) Potential Changes: 2018 NCAA Convention 
Rumblings 
In light of this criticism and the three lawsuits that 
challenge the Year in Residence Rule discussed in this 
Comment, the NCAA is reportedly considering a change to 
its Division I transfer rules.56 During the NCAA Convention, 
held in late January 2018, the NCAA reported that the 
Committee on Transfers has strongly considered extending 
the “One-Time Transfer Exception”57 to all sports.58 One 
source reported that an official was “95% certain” changes to 
the current transfer legislation would be adopted in 2018.59 
At the NCAA Convention in January 2018, the NCAA Board 
of Governors set an April 2018 deadline for transfer rule 
change proposals and anticipates its committees and 
 
 54. Gary Parrish, The NCAA’s New Policy on Transfers Has One Bad 
Unintended Consequence, CBS SPORTS (April 21, 2015), 
https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/the-ncaas-new-policy-on-
transfers-has-one-bad-unintended-consequence. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Michelle Brutlag Hosick, DI Council Moves Start of Basketball Season: 
Football Preseason, Future Transfer Rules Changes also Considered, NCAA (Jan. 
17, 2018, 7:44 PM), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/di-
council-moves-start-basketball-season. 
 57. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 9, at 170, § 14.5.5.2.10. 
 58. Hosick, supra note 56. 
 59. Matt Schick (@ESPN_Schick), TWITTER (Jan. 17, 2018, 8:54 AM), 
https://twitter.com/ESPN_Schick/status/953671983866277888. 
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membership will vote on new transfer regulations, including 
the ground rules for the transfer process and extending the 
one-time exception to all sports, by summer 2018.60 
D. Skepticism of the NCAA Model 
Notwithstanding the three lawsuits challenging the 
Year in Residence Rule, the Division I Committee on 
Transfers’ proposal to change the transfer rules comes 
during an era of serious strife for the NCAA. Many 
commentators have begun to question whether the NCAA’s 
student-athletes at the highest level are actually students, 
given that football and men’s basketball comprise two of the 
four the lowest Graduation Success Rates (GSR) of all 
Division I sports.61 Writing for the New York Times in an 
influential article, entitled “The Myth of the ‘Student-
Athlete,’” Gary Gutting argued that “members of [football 
and men’s basketball] teams are athletes first . . . , both from 
their own standpoint and from that of their schools” as 
schools “point [athletes] toward easier courses and majors 
and offer extraordinary amounts of academic coaching and 
tutoring, primarily designed to keep athletes eligible to 
play.”62 
Donna Lopiano and Gerald Gurney of Inside Higher Ed 
echoed Gutting’s concerns, writing that Division I schools are 
 
 60. Michelle Brutlag Hosick, DI Board of Directors Provides Legislative 
Flexibility, NCAA (Jan. 18, 2018, 5:54 PM), https://www.ncaa.org/about/
resources/media-center/news/di-board-directors-provides-legislative-flexibility. 
 61. NCAA, TRENDS IN GRADUATION SUCCESS RATES AND FEDERAL GRADUATION 
RATES AT NCAA DIVISION I INSTITUTIONS 13 (2017), http://www.ncaa.org/
sites/default/files/2017D1RES_Grad_Rate_Trends_FINAL_20171108.pdf. 
 62. Gutting, supra note 5. Gutting argues further that “given the amount of 
time most such athletes devote to their sports, they would have to be 
academically superior to the average student to do as well in their classes.” Id. 
(emphasis in original). He continues by noting that graduation rates for NCAA 
football and men’s basketball players are sixteen and twenty-five percent, 
respectively, below the average graduation rate, and these numbers understate 
the problem because so many schools “provide underqualified athletes with 
advisers who[se]” main concern is keeping athletes eligible to play. 
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turning a blind eye to admissions requirements for “elite but 
often woefully academically deficient athletes.”63 In light of 
coaching carousels, increased concussion numbers without 
rule reform, and inadequate academic standards, Lopiano 
and Gurney argued that the NCAA is beyond saving: “the 
U.S. Congress should immediately act to establish a 
federally chartered organization to replace a dysfunctional 
NCAA to protect college athletes in the same way that it did 
to protect open amateur sports athletes in 1978 [via the 
Amateur Sports Act].”64 Sally Jenkins of the Washington 
Post reiterated Lopiano and Gurney’s call to dissolve the 
NCAA.65 She maintained the NCAA “doesn’t know what it’s 
supposed to be doing” because it “has no means of enforcing 
[its bylaws]—short of extortion tactics.”66 
1. A Hellacious Fall 2017 for the NCAA 
Jenkins’ 2014 criticism of the NCAA’s inability to govern 
itself rang true in September 2017 when the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office for the Southern District of New York filed three 
complaints and arrested ten people—including four current 
Division I assistant and associate men’s basketball coaches—
for conspiracy, bribery, and wire fraud.67 The arrests came 
 
 63. Donna Lopiano & Gerald Gurney, The NCAA Can’t be Reformed—Replace 
It, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Sept. 11, 2014, 3:00 AM), https://www.insidehighered.com/
views/2014/09/11/ncaa-cant-be-reformed-congress-should-replace-it-essay. The 
authors believe “[a]thletic departments are running opaque academic support 
programs in which staff have direct conflicts of interest from managing athletes’ 
eligibility by seeking easy classes and friendly professors to ensure their 
continued participation on the field or court to control of legions of tutors who 
bring into question the authorship of athletes’ classwork.” Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Sally Jenkins, It’s not that the NCAA Doesn’t Know what it’s Doing; It’s 




 66. Id. 
 67. Shachar Peled, College Basketball Coaches Among Those Charged with 
Federal Crimes, CNN (Sept. 26, 2017, 7:11 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/26/
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after the FBI released a report detailing how these coaches 
were part of a system that bribed recruits to commit to their 
schools with cash payments funded by Adidas.68 These men 
also took bribes from certain athletic and financial advisors, 
who paid the coaches to direct players to enlist the advisors’ 
services.69 By and large, this investigation revealed two 
scary details: (1) at least NCAA basketball players are being 
wrongfully paid to play amateur basketball; and (2) the 
NCAA was incapable of policing the numerous wrongdoers, 
including coaches who should be governed by the 
amateurism standards of its bylaws. 
To make matters worse, just weeks later the NCAA 
Committee on Infractions voted to not penalize the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC) after a 
ten-year investigation into a two-decade academic scandal.70 
Over the course of eighteeen years, UNC offered “paper 
classes” that awarded students high grades for courses in the 
Department of African and Afro-American Studies that were 
 
us/college-basketball-scheme/index.html. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. One coach, Tony Bland, was taped bragging to these managers and 
advisors that he could “definitely mold players and put them in the lap of 
[Adidas].”Id. The largest casualty of this investigation was Louisville head coach, 
Rick Pitino, who the FBI found had called one of the implicated financial advisors 
and directly asked for $100,000 to secure the commitment of a five-star recruit. 
Daniel Rapaport, What We Know About Each School Implicated in the FBI’s 
College Basketball Investigation, SI.COM (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.si.com/c
ollege-basketball/2017/09/29/what-we-know-about-each-school-fbi-investigation. 
Pitino, a College Basketball Hall of Famer and coach of two-time national 
championship teams, was fired on October 16, 2017 and filed suit against Adidas 
for deliberately damaging his reputation. Kyle Boone, Rick Pitino Sues Adidas 
Alleging It Deliberately Damaged His Reputation, CBS SPORTS (Oct. 18, 2017), 
https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/ousted-coach-rick-pitino-
sues-adidas-alleging-it-deliberately-damaged-his-reputation; Gary B. Graves, 
Rick Pitino out at Louisville as expected amid federal probe, ASSOCIATED PRESS: 
NCAA MEN’S BASKETBALL (Oct. 16, 2017), https://collegebasketball.ap.org/
article/rick-pitino-out-louisville-expected-amid-federal-probe. 
 70. Kyle Boone, 10 Key Quotes About the NCAA Letting UNC Off the Hook for 
Academic Misconduct, CBS SPORTS (Oct. 13, 2017), 
https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/10-key-quotes-about-the-
ncaa-letting-unc-off-the-hook-for-academic-misconduct. 
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not actually held and consisted entirely of an easily graded 
paper at the end of the semester.71 Advisors funneled UNC 
athletes, especially those who struggled academically, into 
the department so these athletes remained eligible and could 
continue to compete for the university.72 Where other 
student-athletes wrote papers, took tests, and attended 
classes, UNC student-athletes were handed degrees. The 
NCAA Committee on Infractions investigated five major 
allegations, including lack of institutional control (the worst 
penalty an institution can receive), but ultimately chose not 
to penalize the university because the classes were offered to 
general students, as well as student athletes.73 By not 
penalizing UNC, the NCAA failed to achieve one of its main 
duties—ensuring competitive equity among member 
institutions. 
After an embarrassing October, Dr. Mark Emmert, the 
president of the NCAA, stated that “fundamental change” 
was necessary in college basketball.74 To support this 
conclusion, Emmert pointed to an NCAA-commissioned poll 
that showed seventy-nine percent of Americans believed 
college athletic departments valued revenue over the well-
being of their student athletes and more than half of 
Americans believed the NCAA exacerbated this mentality. 
Furthermore, Emmert revealed that seventy percent of 
Americans believed the school administrations were also to 
blame, and only “a very small portion of Americans” 
supported the Committee on Infractions decision not to 
 
 71. Sara Ganim & Devon Sayers, UNC Report Finds 18 Years of Academic 
Fraud to Keep Athletes Playing, CNN (Oct. 23, 2014, 10:28 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/22/us/unc-report-academic-fraud/index.html. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Scooby Axson, NCAA Declares UNC Did Not Violate Academic Fraud 
Rules, SI.COM (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.si.com/college-
basketball/2017/10/13/ncaa-sanctions-north-carolina-academic-fraud. 
 74. Will Hobson, NCAA President Mark Emmert: ‘Fundamental Change’ 
Needed in College Basketball, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2017/10/30/ncaa-president-
mark-emmert-fundamental-change-needed-in-college-basketball. 
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punish UNC.75 Emmert reiterated his message that change 
is necessary at the 2018 NCAA Convention in his State of 
College Sports address: “[s]candals that call into question 
our commitment to academic integrity make whatever praise 
we have of our higher graduation rates ring pretty 
hollow . . . . What we saw with that FBI investigation is 
Exhibit A for demanding action . . . . It’s corrupt. It’s just 
wrong. And it feeds all the cynics.”76 
As he predicted, some critics were concerned Emmert’s 
call for change in October was just lip-service. According to 
former Duke basketball player, law school grad, and current 
ESPN college basketball analyst, Jay Bilas, “[n]ow you have 
the president saying the system is broken. What, he and his 
staff didn’t know the system was broken two weeks before 
the charges were filed in this matter? Of course they did. The 
system’s been broken forever, so that’s disingenuous to say 
the least.”77 
2. February 2018 
February 2018 proved to be an equally damning month 
for the NCAA as the apparent amateurism farce in NCAA 
men’s basketball was unmasked even more. On the eve of the 
NCAA tournament, with the FBI investigation looming, the 
NCAA officially stripped the Louisville men’s basketball 
team and head coach Rick Pitino of all wins from 2012–15, 
including its 2013 National Championship, because the 
program funded the services of strippers and prostitutes for 
current and prospective student-athletes.78 In this same 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Mitch Sherman, NCAA President: ‘Meaningful Change’ to come Before 
Tipoff of ‘18, ABC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2018), http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/ncaa-
president-meaningful-change-tipoff-18/story?id=52450118. 
 77. Gene Wang, ESPN’s Jay Bilas: ‘The NCAA Makes Its Own Rules, and 
Their Rules are Bad,’ WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2017/10/30/espns-jay-bilas-
the-ncaa-makes-its-own-rules-and-their-rules-are-bad. 
 78. Jacob Bogage & Roman Stubbs, Its NCAA appeal denied, Louisville is 
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week, a Yahoo! report added perennial March Madness 
championship contenders Duke, North Carolina, Kentucky, 
Kansas, and Michigan State to the list of schools which 
bribed recruits to commit with cash advances, loans and 
money transfers.79 Then, hours later, the biggest bombshell 
went off when ESPN reported an FBI wiretap recorded 
Arizona Head Coach Sean Miller, explicitly offering number 
one center prospect80 and 2018 Pac-12 freshman and player 
of the year81 DeAndre Ayton $100,000 if he committed to play 
for the Wildcats.82 Consequently, Miller became the first 
head coach directly linked to offering money to recruits.83 
In response to the reports, NCAA President Mark 
Emmert issued a statement condemning the actions. 
These allegations, if true, point to systematic failures that must be 
fixed and fixed now if we want college sports in America. . . . The 
Board and I are completely committed to making transformational 
changes to the game . . . [and] will continue to cooperate with the 
efforts of federal prosecutors to identify and punish the 
unscrupulous parties seeking to exploit the system through 
 




 79. Pat Forde & Pete Thamel, Federal documents detail sweeping potential 
NCAA violations involving high-profile players, schools, YAHOO! (Feb. 23, 2018), 
https://sports.yahoo.com/exclusive-federal-documents-detail-sweeping-potential-
ncaa-violations-involving-high-profile-players-schools-103338484.html. 
 80. Deandre Ayton, ESPN (Jan. 27, 2017), http://www.espn.com/college-
sports/basketball/recruiting/player/_/id/187828/deandre-ayton. 
 81. Ron Clements, Arizona’s Deandre Ayton both Pac-12 freshman and player 
of the year, SPORTING NEWS (Mar. 6, 2018), http://www.sportingnews.com/ncaa-
basketball/news/arizona-deandre-ayton-ncaa-basketball-pac-12-freshman-
player-of-the-year/nytom1q7x97h1rxxq3q4j2l46. 
 82. Mark Schlabach, FBI wiretaps show Sean Miller discussed $100K 
payment to lock recruit, ESPN (Feb. 25, 2018), http://www.espn.com/mens-
college-basketball/story/_/id/22559284/sean-miller-arizona-christian-dawkins-
discussed-payment-ensure-deandre-ayton-signing-according-fbi-investigation. 
 83. Id. 
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criminal acts.84 
Emmert’s comments were both predictable and 
meaningless. As of April 2018, the NCAA has only proven it 
was incapable of punishing anyone. It took five years to issue 
Louisville a penalty, it chose not to hold UNC accountable for 
two decades of academic fraud, and it created a system where 
coaches paid amateur athletes. The events of the past six 
months prove the NCAA has become an ineffective and 
obsolete governing body for its revenue-generating sports. 
“Student-athlete” and “amateurism” have become buzzwords 
for standards that member institutions can elect to follow 
based on good faith. The reason the FBI began its 
investigation and the U.S. Attorney’s Office issued its 
indictments was because the NCAA was not doing its job. If 
the organization was going to punish its bad actors, it should 
have done so before the government became involved. 
E. The Next Step 
Given the current state of NCAA athletics in the United 
States, it is clear the organization is in dire need of reform. 
The organization had the opportunity to initiate such reform 
at its 2018 Convention, but ultimately chose not to do 
anything in the middle of the academic year.85 However, if 
the skeptics are correct and Emmert’s proposed 
“fundamental change” proves to be a slogan rather than an 
action, internal change is not the only option. Given the 
current legal challenges the NCAA is facing across the 
country, a full-scale restructuring could be mandated by the 
federal courts. 
 
 84. NCAA statement on Yahoo! Sports story, NCAA (Feb 23. 2018, 7:37 AM), 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-statement-yahoo-
sports-story. 
 85. Michael Marot, Emmert expects to see quick changes in college basketball, 
CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 19, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/sns-bc-us—
ncaa-convention—emmert-20180118-story.html. 
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II. JURISPRUDENTIAL BACKGROUND TO THE SEVENTH 
CIRCUIT TRANSFER RULES LITIGATION 
Deppe v. NCAA is one opportunity for a federal court to 
apply the Rule of Reason to an eligibility bylaw, the Year in 
Residence Rule, and order the NCAA to institute meaningful 
change to help adapt its model to the current era of college 
athletics. However, the Seventh Circuit in Deppe must 
decipher a complicated jurisprudential background to 
determine what protections the NCAA warrants under 
antitrust law. 
The first obstacle the Seventh Circuit will encounter is 
the precedential value of the seminal case on antitrust 
attacks to the NCAA’s amateurism model, NCAA v. Board of 
Regents of the University of Oklahoma and University of 
Georgia Athletic Association.86 Where Board of Regents 
conferred antitrust protection to most NCAA bylaws in dicta, 
it was also decided in 1984 when the NCAA looked nothing 
like it does today. Though the Seventh Circuit recently 
reaffirmed this antitrust protection in 2011, in Agnew v. 
NCAA,87 it is impossible to ignore the current state of college 
athletics, which is ripe with hypocrisy. As such, the Seventh 
Circuit should look to a more recent decision that offers a 
realistic and current assessment of the NCAA’s amateur 
sports model, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in O’Bannon v. 
NCAA,88 and to apply the Rule of Reason analysis to the Year 
in Residence Rule. Taken together, these three cases, Board 
of Regents, Agnew, and O’Bannon, constitute the 
jurisprudential background the Deppe court must consider, 
and are thus discussed below. 
 
 86. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 87. 683 F.3d 328, 342–43 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 88. 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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A. NCAA v. Board of Regents 
In Board of Regents, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
certain aspects of the NCAA’s intercollegiate athletics 
operation were subject to antitrust scrutiny under Section 1 
of the Sherman Act and analyzed the NCAA’s conduct under 
the Rule of Reason.89 However, Board of Regents became a 
landmark case for the NCAA for a different reason. In dicta, 
the court wrote that because cooperation between member 
schools was necessary to the overall success of the NCAA, the 
association should be given sufficient antitrust latitude to 
“play[] a critical role in the maintenance of a revered 
tradition of amateurism in college sports.”90 
Correspondingly, the court ruled that most NCAA bylaws 
were presumptively procompetitive and exempt from the 
Rule of Reason.91 So, in a case where the Supreme Court 
confirmed that the NCAA could and did violate antitrust law, 
it also articulated that most other antitrust challenges to the 
organization’s amateur sports model should be dismissed. 
1. Factual Background 
At the advent of network television, college football 
teams handled how and when their games would be 
broadcasted through their own network contracts.92 Yet, as 
television became ubiquitous in the United States, the NCAA 
grew concerned that wall-to-wall college football coverage 
across network television would adversely affect ticket 
sales.93 To counter this threat, the NCAA took control of all 
 
 89. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103, 120. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. at 117. 
 92. See id. at 89. As television provided easier, less expensive access to games, 
the NCAA feared the gate at its games, its major stream of revenue, would 
diminish, and the organization would be in dire financial straits. See id. at 89–
90. 
 93. Id. at 89 (“[T]he [Television] [C]ommittee had concluded that ‘television 
does have an adverse effect on college football attendance . . .’”). 
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television rights and prohibited all member institutions from 
pursuing their own, independent agreements.94 With 
complete control of the rights to televised college football, the 
NCAA restricted the total games televised per season and 
the number of times each team could be seen on local and 
national television.95 The NCAA divided its annual 
broadcast revenue evenly among schools whose games were 
broadcast regardless of the number of viewers and 
geographic markets a game was broadcast in.96 
At issue in Board of Regents was a 1981 agreement 
between the NCAA, ABC, and CBS, which granted both 
networks the semi-exclusive right to broadcast Division I 
football.97 The points of contention in this contract were 
“appearance requirements” and “appearance limitations,” 
which required CBS or ABC to broadcast each of the eighty-
two schools the NCAA deemed fit for broadcast at least once 
during a two-year period, but no more than four times on 
national telecast and six total telecasts.98 
Members of the College Football Association (CFA), 
comprised of schools in the five largest conferences along 
with a few independent teams (e.g., Notre Dame), believed 
they deserved a voice in negotiating broadcast rights and 
warranted a bigger portion of the revenue.99 Accordingly, 
CFA signed its own exclusive agreement with a different 
network, NBC, that provided for an unrestricted number of 
television appearances and greater revenues distributed 
among the group.100 In response, the NCAA threatened to 
impose athletic department-wide sanctions on any school 
 
 94. Id. at 94. 
 95. Id. at 90. 
 96. Id. at 93. 
 97. Id. at 92. 
 98. Id. at 94–95. 
 99. Id. at 89, 94–95. 
 100. Id. at 94–95. 
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that performed under the NBC contract.101 As a result, CFA 
filed suit against the NCAA for an illegal restraint on output 
in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.102 
2. Holding and Analysis 
In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court struck down the 
NCAA’s restrictions on college football broadcasting rights 
by applying the Rule of Reason antitrust analysis.103 Writing 
for the majority, Justice Stevens held that the NCAA’s 
exclusive broadcast agreements with ABC and CBS 
constituted horizontal price fixing and output limitation, 
which generally would be deemed a per se illegal restraint on 
trade.104 However, because some cooperation between 
competitors was necessary to coordinate games105 for the 
NCAA’s distinct product of college football,106 the court 
 
 101. Id. at 95. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 120 (“Today we hold only that the record supports the District 
Court’s conclusion that by curtailing output and blunting the ability of member 
institutions to respond to consumer preference, the NCAA has restricted rather 
than enhanced the place of intercollegiate athletics in the Nation’s life.”). 
 104. Id. at 99–100 (finding the NCAA’s exclusive agreements constituted “an 
agreement among competitors on the way in which they will compete with one 
another,” which would “ordinarily [be] condemned as a matter of law under an 
‘illegal per se’ approach because the probability that these practices are anti-
competitive is so high”). 
 105. Id. at 101 (including “such matters as the size of the field, the number of 
players on a team, and the extent to which physical violence is to be encouraged 
or proscribed, all must be agreed upon, and all restrain the manner in which 
institutions compete”). 
 106. Id. at 101–02 (“The identification of this ‘product’ with an academic 
tradition differentiates college football from and makes it more popular than 
professional sports to which it might otherwise be comparable . . . . In order to 
preserve the character and quality of the ‘product,’ athletes must not be paid, 
must be required to attend class, and the like. And the integrity of the ‘product’ 
cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement; if an institution adopted such 
restrictions unilaterally, its effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field 
might soon be destroyed. Thus, the NCAA plays a vital role in enabling college 
football to preserve its character, and as a result enables a product to be marketed 
which might otherwise be unavailable. In performing this role, its actions widen 
consumer choice—not only the choices available to sports fans but also those 
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applied the less stringent Rule of Reason.107 
Though certain horizontal restraints on competition 
were critical to the overall success of college football,108 the 
court held that the NCAA’s exclusive broadcast agreement 
did not survive antitrust scrutiny even under the less-
stringent Rule of Reason analysis because the contracts 
produced significant anticompetitive effects in the college 
football broadcasting market.109 First, the court found the 
uniqueness of the product of college football generated huge 
consumer demand.110 If member institutions were not 
restricted from selling television rights to broadcast their 
teams’ games, these schools could negotiate their own 
broadcast contracts and networks would televise more 
college football.111 However, because the NCAA retained the 
sole right to negotiate broadcast contracts, it held significant 
market power, and could enter into highly lucrative 
agreements while still restricting the number of games 
televised.112 Further, schools had no choice but to comply 
based on fear of sanction or expulsion from the NCAA.113 
Finally, the court found that protecting ticket sales during 
televised games was a pretextual justification for restricting 
broadcasts.114 As such, the NCAA’s television broadcast 
 
available to athletes—and hence can be viewed as procompetitive.”). 
 107. Id. at 100. 
 108. Id. at 101 (“[W]hat is critical is that this case involves an industry in 
which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be 
available at all.”). 
 109. Id. at 104–07, 107 (concluding the “[p]rice [to broadcast college football] is 
higher and output lower than they would otherwise be, and both are 
unresponsive to consumer preference”). 
 110. Id. at 111 (finding “advertisers will pay a premium price per viewer to 
reach audiences watching college football because of their demographic 
characteristics”). 
 111. Id. at 108 (noting that “many telecasts that would occur in a competitive 
market are foreclosed by the NCAA’s plan”). 
 112. Id. at 105. 
 113. Id. at 106, 106 n.31. 
 114. See id. at 116–17 (“The television plan protects ticket sales by limiting 
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restrictions violated the Rule of Reason. 
3. Important Dicta for Future Litigation 
The Supreme Court in Board of Regents held that the 
NCAA’s amateur sports model was subject to scrutiny under 
the Rule of Reason analysis under the Sherman Act, but 
ironically, also insulated the NCAA from nearly all antitrust 
liability for three decades.115 Three of Justice Stevens’s 
statements have defined the legacy of Board of Regents for 
antitrust plaintiffs like the student-athletes currently 
challenging the NCAA in the Seventh Circuit. 
First, in Part III of the decision, the court ruled that the 
NCAA had market power in the college football broadcasting 
market.116 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Stevens 
stated that just because a party fails to prove market power 
does not automatically relieve the challenged party from 
antitrust liability, especially when a non-compete agreement 
or agreement to restrict output exists.117 Instead, where 
anticompetitive effects are so obvious, as in the NCAA 
agreements restricting broadcast rights, a court can apply 
the Rule of Reason without defining a market. The key 
language the court cites to is found in footnote thirty-nine: 
“[t]he essential point is that the rule of reason can sometimes 
be applied in the twinkling of an eye.”118 In Board of Regents, 
the court applied the Rule of Reason “in a twinkling of an 
eye” to the NCAA’s restrictive broadcast contract to find 
antitrust liability under the Sherman Act.119 However, in 
 
output—just as any monopolist increases revenues by reducing output. By 
seeking to insulate live ticket sales from the full spectrum of competition because 
of its assumption that the product itself is insufficiently attractive to consumers, 
petitioner forwards a justification that is inconsistent with the basic policy of the 
Sherman Act.”). 
 115. See infra notes 111–12 and accompanying text. 
 116. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 111. 
 117. Id. at 109. 
 118. Id. at 110 n.39 (emphasis added). 
 119. See id. at 110 (“We have never required proof of market power in such a 
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future legal action against the NCAA, numerous courts, 
including the Seventh Circuit, hastily applied this phrase 
without much explanation to support a finding that NCAA 
bylaws were exempt from Rule of Reason analysis at the 
motion to dismiss stage.120 
Next, in Part VI of the decision, Justice Stevens 
addressed the NCAA’s argument that telecast restrictions 
helped maintain competitive balance among member 
institutions.121 While the Court agreed the NCAA had an 
interest in maintaining competitive balance among schools 
to achieve a uniform, marketable product, it held these 
broadcast restrictions had little to do with competitive 
balance.122 However, in analyzing this argument, Justice 
Stevens supplied the NCAA with the ammunition to defeat 
most future antitrust challenges to its Bylaws in this 
pronouncement: 
[A] certain degree of cooperation is necessary if the type of 
competition that [the NCAA] and its member institutions seek to 
market is to be preserved. It is reasonable to assume that most of 
the regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering 
competition among amateur athletic teams and therefore 
procompetitive because they enhance public interest in 
intercollegiate athletics. The specific restraints on football telecasts 
that are challenged in this case do not, however, fit into the same 
mold as do rules defining the conditions of the contest, the eligibility 
of participants, or the manner in which members of a joint 
enterprise shall share the responsibilities and the benefits of the 
total venture.123 
In essence, Justice Stevens declared that most NCAA 
 
case. This naked restraint on price and output requires some competitive 
justification even in the absence of a detailed market analysis.”). 
 120. See, e.g., Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 342–43 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 121. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117 (“Petitioner argues that the interest in 
maintaining a competitive balance among amateur athletic teams is legitimate 
and important and that it justifies the regulations challenged in this case. We 
agree with the first part of the argument but not the second.”). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. (emphasis added). 
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bylaws passed Rule of Reason antitrust analysis at first 
glance. So long as a rule complied with private association 
law,124 the NCAA was free to run its amateur sports model 
as it pleased. Later, the Court reaffirmed this conclusion in 
the final important statement from Board of Regents dicta: 
The NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered 
tradition of amateurism in college sports. There can be no question 
but that it needs ample latitude to play that role, or that the 
preservation of the student-athlete in higher education adds 
richness and diversity to intercollegiate athletics and is entirely 
consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act. Today we hold only 
that the record supports the District Court’s conclusion that by 
curtailing output and blunting the ability of member institutions to 
respond to consumer preference, the NCAA has restricted rather 
than enhanced the place of intercollegiate athletics in the Nation’s 
life.125 
4. Aftermath: The Advent of Big Money in College 
Sports 
Board of Regents ushered big money into college 
athletics by opening the door for the multi-billion-dollar 
broadcasting contracts college football and men’s basketball 
enjoy today. After the case was decided, the NCAA conferred 
the power of negotiating media agreements for regular 
season competition in all sports to each athletic 
conference,126 but retained broadcast rights for its national 
 
 124. In NCAA v. Tarkanian, the Supreme Court held that the NCAA was not 
a state actor. 488 U.S. 179, 181–82 (1988). As a result, the NCAA is treated as a 
private association. “Traditionally, the courts have only intervened in the affairs 
of private associations where the organizatin’s actions violate its own rules or 
where its acts constitute fraud or illegality or are arbitrary and unreasonable. In 
situations other than these, the courts historically have been hesitant to 
interfere.” RAY YASSER ET AL., SPORTS LAW CASES & MATERIALS 54 (7th ed. 2011). 
 125. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120. 
 126. See Thomas A. Baker III & Natasha T. Brison, From Board of Regents to 
O’Bannon: How Antitrust and Media Rights Have Influenced College Football, 26 
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 331, 341 (2016). The most lucrative college football and 
basketball broadcasting contracts are held by the “Power Five” Conferences. The 
Power Five is a group of the five most athletically dominant and profitable 
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championships.127 In 1985, the NCAA signed a three-year, 
$94.7 million deal with CBS to broadcast the Division I Men’s 
College Basketball Championships.128 That contract is now a 
fourteen-year, $10.8 billion deal as of 2010.129 In the 2011–
12 academic year, the NCAA generated $705 million in 
media revenue, which was eighty-one percent of its annual 
revenue.130 ESPN reportedly paid the NCAA between $5.64 
billion131 and $7.3 billion132 in November 2012 to broadcast 
the College Football Playoff, while the NCAA and 
CBS/Turner agreed to an eight-year, $8.8 billion extension to 
continue to broadcast the Men’s Basketball Championships 
in April 2016.133 
 
conferences in Division I college athletics, made up of the Atlantic Coast 
Conference (ACC), Big 12, Big 10, Pac-12, and Southeastern Conference (SEC). 
Paula Lavigne, Rich Get Richer in College Sports As Poorer Schools Struggle to 
Keep Up, ESPN (Sep. 6, 2016), http://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/1744
7429/power-5-conference-schools-made-6-billion-last-year-gap-haves-nots-grows. 
In the 2015–16 academic year, Power Five conferences generated $6 billion in 
revenues—$4 billion more than the rest of the Division I schools combined. Id.. 
 127. Thomas Scully, Note, NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of 
Oklahoma: The NCAA’s Television Plan is Sacked by the Sherman Act, 34 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 857, 860 n.19 (1985). 
 128. Revenue, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances/revenue 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2018). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Jerry Hinnen, ESPN Reaches 12-Year Deal to Air College Football 
Playoffs, CBS SPORTS (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www.cbssports.com/
collegefootball/eye-on-college-football/21083689/espn-reaches-12year-deal-to-air-
college-football-playoffs. 
 132. Frank Pallotta, ESPN’s $7.3 Billion College Football Gamble Pays Off, 
CNN (Jan 13., 2015, 5:33 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/01/12/media/espn-
college-football-playoff-pays-off. 
 133. Turner, CBS and the NCAA Reach Long-Term Multimedia Rights 
Extension for NCAA Division I Men’s Basketball Championship: New Agreement 
Extends Television, Digital and Marketing Rights Through 2032, NCAA (Apr. 12, 
2016), http://www.ncaa.com/news/basketball-men/article/2016-04-12/turner-cbs-
and-ncaa-reach-long-term-multimedia-rights. 
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5. Subsequent Judicial Interpretations: Antitrust 
Insulation of Eligibility Bylaws 
Beyond major revenues, Board of Regents dictated that 
certain horizontal restraints defined in the bylaws were 
necessary for the NCAA to operate and thus presumptively 
procompetitive. Future courts were left to determine exactly 
which bylaws were immune from antitrust attack and which 
would be subject to the Rule of Reason. Of particular 
importance to this Comment is the post-Board of Regents 
jurisprudence regarding student-athlete eligibility rules 
because the Year in Residence Rule functions as an eligibility 
bylaw.134 
After Board of Regents, federal appellate courts ruled 
that NCAA eligibility bylaws on the whole did not violate the 
Sherman Act under two different reasons.135 First, some 
courts ruled the bylaws were noncommercial and thus not 
subject to antitrust scrutiny at all.136 Other courts found 
eligibility bylaws to be a presumptively reasonable 
commercial restraint that helped the NCAA preserve its 
unique model for intercollegiate sports.137 
 
 134. See discussion of NCAA Division I Manual, article 14, supra notes 43–44. 
 135. See Matthew J. Mitten, Why and How the Supreme Court Should Have 
Decided O’Bannon v. NCAA, 62 ANTITRUST BULL. 62, 77 (2017), 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0003603X17691383. 
 136. See Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that the 
“NCAA’s rules on recruiting student athletes, specifically those rules prohibiting 
improper inducements and academic fraud, are all explicitly non-commercial”); 
Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 185–86 (3d Cir. 1998) (concluding “eligibility rules 
are not related to the NCAA’s commercial or business activities” and “that the 
Sherman Act does not apply to the NCAA’s promulgation of eligibility rules”); 
Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1094 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 908 
(1993) (holding that the NCAA’s “no-draft” and “no-agent” eligibility rules were 
not a commercial restraint on trade and thus did not cause antitrust injury). 
 137. See McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344–45 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(treating eligibility bylaws as commercial restraints but upholding their antitrust 
validity under the Rule of Reason because “[t]he eligibility rules create the 
[unique college football] product and allow its survival in the face of 
commercializing pressures”); see also Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 340, 343 
(7th Cir. 2012). 
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The most important decision from the post-Board of 
Regents jurisprudence for eligibility bylaws is Agnew v. 
NCAA,138 a 2012 decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit. In Agnew, the court affirmed the district 
court’s grant of the NCAA’s motion to dismiss, with 
prejudice, in a class action suit by the student-athletes who 
alleged that two scholarship restrictions set forth in the 
NCAA Bylaws—scholarship caps per team and prohibitions 
on multi-year scholarships—had an anticompetitive effect on 
the market for student-athletes.139 
The court’s opinion is a straightforward reiteration of 
Board of Regents dicta. First, the court began by noting that 
NCAA bylaws are generally subject to the Sherman Act.140 
Immediately after, however, the court qualified this 
statement: just because the bylaws could be challenged 
under the Sherman Act does not “suggest that all NCAA 
bylaws, or even any NCAA bylaws” actually violate antitrust 
law.141 Accordingly, the court used Board of Regents dicta to 
put forth the rule for whether an NCAA bylaw is valid under 
the Sherman Act: “when an NCAA bylaw is clearly meant to 
help maintain the ‘revered tradition of amateurism in college 
sports’ or the ‘preservation of the student-athlete in higher 
education,’ the bylaw will be presumed procompetitive, since 
we must give the NCAA ‘ample latitude to play that role.’”142 
Much like Board of Regents, the dicta in Agnew is far 
more important to this Comment than the holding. After 
 
 138. 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 139. Id. at 333–34. While scholarship caps still exist for all teams who compete 
in Division I and II competition (mainly to comply with Title IX), the same year 
Agnew was decided, the NCAA membership voted to allow schools to grant multi-
year scholarships. See Jon Solomon, Schools Can Give Out 4-Year Athletic 
Scholarships, But Many Don’t, CBS SPORTS (Sep. 16, 2014), 
https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/schools-can-give-out-4-year-
athletic-scholarships-but-many-dont. 
 140. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 340. 
 141. Id. at 341. 
 142. Id. at 342–43 (citing NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984)). 
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defining this test for the validity of bylaws under the 
Sherman Act, the court used eligibility bylaws as an example 
of something the Supreme Court would have treated as 
presumptively procompetitive. In a blanket statement, the 
court states definitively, “[m]ost—if not all—eligibility 
rules . . . fall comfortably within the presumption of 
procompetitiveness afforded to certain NCAA regulations” by 
Board of Regents.143 Next, the opinion notes that “no ‘detailed 
analysis,’ . . . would be necessary to deem such rules 
procompetitive,” and it explicitly states that challenges to 
eligibility bylaws would be properly disposed at the motion 
to dismiss stage.144 To bolster this conclusion,145 the court 
employed two basic eligibility rules, one requiring class 
attendance and another prohibiting cash payments to 
student-athletes beyond cost of attendance, to support its 
position that eligibility rules help maintain the role of the 
student-athlete in academia and protect the ideal of amateur 
athletics.146 
 
 143. Id. at 343. 
 144. Id. (citing Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102). 
 145. See id. It is important to note that the court’s discussion of eligibility 
bylaws had no bearing on the outcome of the case. Id. at 343–44 (“The Bylaws at 
issue in this case, however, are not eligibility rules, nor do we conclude they ‘fit 
into the same mold’ as eligibility rules. . . . These Bylaws—a one-year limit to 
scholarships and a limit on scholarships per team—are not inherently or 
obviously necessary for the preservation of amateurism, the student-athlete, or 
the general product of college football.”). In Agnew, plaintiffs challenged financial 
aid bylaws—an entirely different section unto themselves. They are found in 
Article 15 of the NCAA Division I Manual, while Eligibility Bylaws are found in 
Article 14. See NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 9, at 179–203, § 15. 
 146. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 343. It is important to note that the two examples of 
eligibility bylaws the court illustrates are oversimplifications of the NCAA’s 
rules. First, no part of the bylaws require student-athletes to attend class Rather, 
“[t]o be eligible to represent an institution in intercollegiate athletics competition, 
a student-athlete shall be enrolled in at least a minimum full-time program of 
studies, be in good academic standing . . . as determined by the academic 
authorities who determine the meaning of such phrases for all students of the 
institution, subject to controlling legislation of the conference(s) or similar 
association of which the institution is a member.” NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, 
supra note 9, at 143, § 14.01.2.1 (emphasis added). While academic authorities at 
a school would likely require the student-athlete to attend class, the NCAA in 
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6. Issues with Agnew 
In a tangential discussion that had no bearing on the 
outcome of the case, the Seventh Circuit in Agnew adopted 
an incorrect standard for why eligibility bylaws pass Rule of 
Reason muster. Agnew’s precedential value for the Seventh 
Circuit was problematic for future litigants who filed 
antitrust challenges to any of the NCAA’s two articles worth 
of eligibility bylaws, as in Pugh, Deppe and Vassar. Through 
two oversimplified examples of eligibility bylaws,147 the court 
justified treating all twenty-five NCAA eligibility bylaws as 
presumptively procompetitive. Accordingly, because the 
validity of these bylaws was so obvious to the court, it used 
footnote thirty-nine from Board of Regents148 to set an 
improper procedural standard that permitted courts to 
dismiss any portion of a complaint that dealt with an 
eligibility bylaw at the motion to dismiss stage. Granting this 
motion to dismiss stands in direct opposition to widely 
accepted federal pleading standards set forth in Bell Atlantic 
v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which requires a court to 
first distinguish facts from legal conclusions and then to 
evaluate plausible claims for relief based on judicial 
experience.149 As proven by the inconsistencies in the 
amateurism model in the past six months, plaintiffs that 
challenge eligibility bylaws clearly state a plausible claim for 
 
fact has no eligibility bylaw on its books requiring class attendance. Second, “cash 
payments . . . beyond the cost of attendance” are treated under Article 12, 
Amateurism and Athletics Eligibility, which prohibits student-athletes from 
receiving financial assistance beyond the cost of attendance in specific, 
enumerated situations (e.g. when the student-athlete “(a) [u]ses his or her 
athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport; (b) [a]ccepts 
a promise of pay even if such pay is to be received following completion of 
intercollegiate athletics participation; . . . [or] (d) [r]eceives, directly or indirectly, 
a salary, reimbursement of expenses or any other form of financial assistance 
from a professional sports organization based on athletics skill or participation, 
except as permitted by NCAA rules and regulations.” Id. at 55–56, § 12.1.2. 
 147. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 148. 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.39 (1984). 
 149. See, e.g., Christine P. Bartholomew, Twiqbal in Context, 65 J. L. EDUC. 
744, 749–51 (2016). 
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relief. Nonetheless, future challenges to all eligibility bylaws 
in the NCAA’s home circuit would be dismissed before the 
court could determine their validity under the Rule of 
Reason. 
While challenges to eligibility bylaws may have been 
properly dismissed at the time of Board of Regents, the 
developments in college athletics over the past thirty years 
makes outright dismissal of a similar antitrust challenge 
problematic. In the current era of college sports, eligibility 
looks like more of a slogan than a bylaw, which makes 
Agnew’s precedential weight increasingly problematic. 
Though Agnew was decided in 2011, the writing was on 
the wall for the NCAA as to when a major scandal would 
break and the faults in its amateurism model would be 
exposed. As opposed to relying on a nearly thirty-year-old 
precedent to make a blanket pronouncement about eligibility 
bylaws, which no doubt would be challenged in the coming 
years, the Seventh Circuit should have left the discussion of 
eligibility bylaws for a case that actually challenged these 
bylaws, not treated them in the dicta of a challenge to 
financial aid rules. Four years later, the Ninth Circuit 
attempted to correct the Seventh Circuit’s mistake in 
O’Bannon. 
B. O’Bannon v. NCAA 
Where the NCAA, its conferences, schools, 
administrators, athletic departments, trainers, coaches, and 
staff have all received a piece of the billion-dollar deals, the 
one group that the NCAA cannot survive without—the 
student-athletes—has not.150 While Division I athletes were 
 
 150. Whether student-athletes deserve to be paid has long been debated. 
Recently, the debate has gathered greater attention because of the ever-
expanding revenues in college athletics. On why student-athletes should be paid, 
see, for example, Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Athletes be 
Paid to Play, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206, 223 (1990); Jason Gurdus, Note, 
Protection Off of the Playing Field: Student Athletes Should be Considered 
University Employees for Purposes of Workers’ Compensation, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
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allowed to receive up to a full grant-in-aid scholarship at 
their schools, student-athletes began to question if they were 
really receiving the benefit of their bargain as certain 
financial models valued athletes at far more than their 
scholarships were actually worth.151 
In 2008, Ed O’Bannon, a former All-American basketball 
player and 1995 national champion at UCLA, brought a class 
action lawsuit against the NCAA, alleging the organization 
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by profiting off the use 
of student-athletes’ names, images, and likenesses (NILs) 
without compensating the athletes.152 Although O’Bannon 
framed his suit on the commercial use of NILs, this case 
turned into the first major battle in the federal courts about 
whether the NCAA could justify not paying student-athletes 
based solely on the NCAA’s role as gatekeeper of amateur 
athletics in the United States. 
 
907, 916 (2001); Kathryn Young, Note, Deconstructing the Façade of Amateurism: 
Antitrust and Intellectual Property Arguments in Favor of Compensating Athletes, 
12 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 338, 352–54 (2013). On why student-athletes should 
not be paid, see, for example, Christopher M. Parent, Forward Progress? An 
Analysis of Whether Student-Athletes Should Be Paid, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 
226, 237 (2004); Patrick Hurby, This is How To Pay College Athletes, DEADSPIN 
(Mar. 6, 2018, 2:17 PM), https://deadspin.com/this-is-how-to-pay-college-athletes-
1823353456; John R. Thelin, Here’s Why We Shouldn’t Pay College Athletes, TIME: 
MONEY (Mar. 1, 2016), http://time.com/money/4241077/why-we-shouldnt-pay-
college-athletes; Ekow N. Yankah, Why NCAA Athletes Shouldn’t Be Paid, NEW 
YORKER (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/sporting-scene/why-
ncaa-athletes-shouldnt-be-paid. 
 151. A 2013 article by Business Insider concluded that fair market value of the 
average FBS football players was $137,357 per year. See Tony Manfred, Here’s 
How Much Big-Time College Athletes Should Be Getting Paid, BUSINESS INSIDER 
(Mar. 20, 2013, 12:26 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-how-much-
college-athletes-are-worth-2013-3. In 2016, Business Insider found the average 
division I basketball player was worth $170,098 per year. See Cork Gains & 
Diana Yukari, The Average Division I Basketball Player Is Worth $170,098 Per 
Year to His School, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 16, 2017, 10:04 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/college-basketball-player-value-2017-3. Even 
more alarming is Business Insider’s valuation of players at top basketball schools. 
The 2016 study found the average basketball player for the University of 
Louisville was worth about $1.7 million per year, while the average Duke 
basketball player was worth $1.16 million to the university. See id. 
 152. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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1. Procedural History 
O’Bannon was decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit after the NCAA appealed from a decision 
of the Northern District of California.153 Northern District 
Judge, Claudia Wilken, held that the NCAA could no longer 
prohibit schools from paying players for use of NILs, that 
student-athletes could now be awarded up to the cost of 
attendance in exchange for their athletic services,154 and that 
FBS football and Division I basketball student-athletes were 
entitled to a payment of five thousand dollars per year, to be 
set aside in trust until graduation or the end of a student-
athlete’s career.155 At issue in the Ninth Circuit was whether 
the NCAA’s amateurism bylaws were subject to antitrust 
law, and, if so, whether they were an unlawful restraint on 
trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
2. Factual Background 
Ed O’Bannon was a four-time all-American basketball 
player at UCLA, who excelled at the college level but did not 
make it in the pros.156 Years after his college career ended, 
O’Bannon, a car salesman,157 was visiting a friend’s house 
when he witnessed his friend’s son playing a college 
basketball video game and saw himself.158 The video game 
avatar played for UCLA, looked exactly like O’Bannon 
 
 153. Id. at 1053. 
 154. Cost of attendance consists of a full-tuition scholarship, room and board, 
and a reasonable payment of the anticipated cost of living expenses student-
athletes incur like books, food, travel, and home and cell phone bills. Marc Tracy 
& Ben Strauss, Court Strikes Down Payments to College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/sports/obannon-ncaa-case-
court-of-appeals-ruling.html. 
 155. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F.Supp.3d 955, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 156. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055. 
 157. Between Selling Cars, Former UCLA Star Ed O’Bannon Takes on the 
NCAA Over Pay, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/
sports/2014/02/19/between-selling-cars-former-ucla-star-ed-obannon-takes-on-nc
aa-over-pay.html. 
 158. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055. 
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(African American, bald head), was adorned with O’Bannon’s 
number 31, and had his patented lefty jump shot.159 The only 
characteristic the avatar lacked was O’Bannon’s name.160 
O’Bannon was never notified this avatar would be in the 
video game, claimed he never consented to it, and was never 
paid for the use of his NIL.161 The game was produced by 
Electronic Arts (EA) and licensed by the NCAA.162 In 
response, O’Bannon sued the NCAA and the Collegiate 
Licensing Company,163 claiming that the NCAA’s 
amateurism rules prevented student-athletes from being 
paid for their NILs and thus constituted an illegal restraint 
on trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.164 
3. Holding and Analysis 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and 
reversed in part Judge Wilken’s decision.165 Overall, the 
court held that contrary to Board of Regents, the NCAA’s 
rules preventing amateur compensation were not immune 
from antitrust challenges,166 college athletes were injured as 
a result of these amateur compensation rules,167 and the 
compensation rules were subject to Rule of Reason 
analysis.168 
Applying the Rule of Reason, the court found that the 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. The Collegiate Licensing Company (CLC) manages license grants, 
trademark protection, and controls the brands for the NCAA, nearly 200 of its 
member institutions, its bowl games, the numerous athletic conferences, and the 
Heisman Trophy. About IMG College Licensing, IMG C. LICENSING, 
https://www.clc.com/About-CLC.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 2017). 
 164. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055. 
 165. Id. at 1053. 
 166. Id. at 1066. 
 167. Id. at 1067. 
 168. Id. at 1070. 
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NCAA’s compensation rules fix the price for NIL rights in the 
scholarship bundle schools provide their athletes, which 
“extinguish[es] one form of competition” schools may use to 
get recruits.169 However, the court found the NCAA’s 
compensation rules serve two procompetitive purposes: 
“integrating academics with athletics” and protecting the 
popularity of NCAA athletics by ensuring its athletes remain 
amateurs.170 In the last step of the Rule of Reason analysis, 
the court found that a less restrictive alternative to the 
NCAA’s current rule would be to provide athletes up to the 
cost of attendance to cover the “legitimate” costs of attending 
school, but would not jeopardize the amateurism of the model 
because the money would be connected to educational 
expenses of the athletes.171 Nonetheless, the court ruled that 
providing student-athletes with a cash payout of five 
thousand dollars per year upon the completion of a student-
athlete’s career violated the general principles of 
amateurism because any pay-for-play compensation would 
be considered a salary.172 
4. Important Dicta in O’Bannon for Future Litigation 
The single most important commentary to come out of 
O’Bannon was the Ninth Circuit’s unwillingness to confer 
upon the NCAA the broad antitrust deference granted by 
Board of Regents. According to the court, 
Board of Regents . . . did not approve the NCAA’s amateurism rules 
as categorically consistent with the Sherman Act. Rather, it held 
that, because many NCAA rules (among them, the amateurism 
rules) are part of the “character and quality of the [NCAA’s] 
‘product,’”. . . no NCAA rule should be invalidated without a Rule of 
Reason analysis. The Court’s long encomium to amateurism, 
though impressive-sounding, was therefore dicta. . . . [We] are not 
bound by Board of Regents to conclude that every NCAA rule that 
 
 169. Id. at 1071–72. 
 170. Id. at 1073. 
 171. Id. at 1075. 
 172. See id. at 1078. 
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somehow relates to amateurism is automatically valid.173 
The court then criticized how the NCAA sought to use 
Board of Regents as the end all and be all for litigation 
against its amateurism rules: 
What is more, even if the language in Board of Regents addressing 
amateurism were not dicta, it would not support the tremendous 
weight that the NCAA seeks to place upon it. The Court’s opinion 
supports the proposition that the preservation of amateurism is a 
legitimate procompetitive purpose for the NCAA to pursue, but the 
NCAA is not asking us to find merely that its amateurism rules are 
procompetitive; rather, it asks us to hold that those rules are 
essentially exempt from antitrust scrutiny. Nothing in Board of 
Regents supports such an exemption. To say that the NCAA’s 
amateurism rules are procompetitive, as Board of Regents did, is 
not to say that they are automatically lawful; a restraint that serves 
a procompetitive purpose can still be invalid under the Rule of 
Reason if a substantially less restrictive rule would further the 
same objectives equally well.174 
Overall, these two statements justified the Ninth 
Circuit’s breakthrough holding—the NCAA’s amateurism 
model is no longer immune from antitrust challenges. As 
opposed to dismissing the case “in the twinkling of an eye,” 
as first proposed in footnote thirty-nine of Board of Regents, 
the Ninth Circuit applied the three-step Rule of Reason 
analysis to an amateurism bylaw previous courts would have 
considered to “fit into the same mold” as other presumptively 
procompetitive bylaws. 
5. Precedential Value 
The NCAA appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
O’Bannon to the U.S. Supreme Court, but its appeal was 
denied.175 Many commentators believe that the next 
successful antitrust challenge levied against the NCAA could 
 
 173. Id. at 1063 (emphasis added). 
 174. Id. at 1063–64 (emphasis in original). 
 175. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016). 
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place its entire amateurism model in jeopardy.176 However, 
where O’Bannon offers an interpretation of Board of Regents 
that is a pragmatic view of today’s NCAA and all of its 
realities, because the Supreme Court denied certiorari it is 
only persuasive authority outside of the Ninth Circuit; its 
precedential value is yet to be determined. 
III. THE ANTITRUST CHALLENGES TO THE NCAA’S TRANSFER 
BYLAW: PUGH & DEPPE 
Despite the uncertainty of its authority, one group of 
student-athletes has already attempted to capitalize on the 
NCAA’s potential antitrust vulnerability found in 
O’Bannon.177 In less than thirteen months, between 
November 2015 and November 2016, Hagens Berman filed 
three class-action lawsuits challenging the Year in Residence 
Rule178 for transfer student-athletes as an illegal restraint 
on trade under the Sherman Act. Two of these cases, Pugh v. 
NCAA and Deppe v. NCAA, have already been decided in the 
NCAA’s favor on motions to dismiss by Judge Tanya Walton 
Pratt of the Southern District of Indiana.179 However, the 
Seventh Circuit granted the plaintiff’s appeal in Deppe and 
heard oral arguments in September 2017.180 The court has 
not yet issued a decision as of April 2018. In the third case, 
 
 176. See, e.g., William W. Berry III, Amending Amateurism Saving 
Intercollegiate Athletics Through Conference-Athlete Revenue Sharing, 68 ALA. L. 
REV. 551, 573 (2016); John Niemeyer, The End of an Era: The Mounting 
Challenges to the NCAA’s Model of Amateurism, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 883, 932 (2015); 
Audrey C. Sheetz, Student-Athletes v. NCAA: Preserving Amateurism in College 
Sports Amidst the Fight for Player Compensation, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 865, 881 
(2016). 
 177. 802 F.3d 1049. 
 178. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 9, at 168, §14.5.5.1. 
 179. Deppe v. NCAA, No. 1:16-cv-00528-TWP-DKL, 2017 U.S. Dist. 31709, at 
*1, *2 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2017); Pugh v. NCAA, No. 1:15-cv-01747-TWP-DKL, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132122, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 27, 2016). 
 180. Oral Argument, Deppe v. NCAA, No. 17-1711 (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 2017), 
https://player.fm/series/oral-arguments-for-the-court-of-appeals-for-the-seventh-
circuit/peter-deppe-v-ncaa. 
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Vassar v. NCAA, the parties have agreed that the Deppe 
appeal likely will be dispositive of the plaintiff’s antitrust 
claims against the NCAA and will await the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision.181 
Judge Pratt’s decisions in Pugh and Deppe were 
unsurprising. Both lawsuits were pleaded in the same 
district court in the Seventh Circuit where Agnew182 would 
be mandatory authority. Since bylaw 14.5.5.1 is an eligibility 
bylaw, Agnew dictates that the Year in Residence Rule is 
presumptively procompetitive and the district court could 
dismiss the challenge in “the twinkling of an eye.” However, 
where Judge Pratt’s decision falls in line with previous 
Seventh Circuit jurisprudence, it has the potential to create 
a dangerous precedent by insulating the NCAA’s model from 
antitrust challenges to bylaws that have proven to be 
ineffective. Accordingly, it makes the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in Deppe that much more important to future 
litigants who seek to challenge the antitrust status of 
eligibility bylaws. 
A. Pugh v. NCAA 
1. Factual Background 
In 2010, Devin Pugh accepted a full scholarship to play 
Division I FCS football at Weber State University in Ogden, 
Utah.183 Pugh was promised a yearly renewable scholarship 
by then-head coach, Ron McBride, so long as he remained 
 
 181. “MINUTE entry before the Honorable Andrea R. Wood: Status hearing 
held. The parties acknowledge that the outcome of the appeal in Deppe v. NCAA, 
Case No. 17-1711 pending in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, will 
likely be dispositive of the antitrust claim in plaintiff’s complaint here.” Minute 
Entry, Vassar v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:16-cv-10590 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 
22, 2017) (hereinafter Vassar Minute Entry). 
 182. Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 183. Pugh, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132122, at *2. 
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academically eligible.184 At Weber State, Pugh redshirted185 
his freshman year and then played two seasons under 
McBride.186 In those two seasons, he played eighteen games 
for the Wildcats at cornerback, tallying forty-two tackles and 
four interceptions.187 Nevertheless, after his redshirt 
sophomore season,188 Coach McBride retired and was 
replaced by Jody Sears, who instructed Pugh to pursue a 
transfer because he would not renew the cornerback’s 
scholarship.189 
After receiving his release,190 Pugh received full grant-
in-aid offers from Division I FBS and FCS schools.191 
However, all of these transfer options were contingent on 
Pugh being able to play two years of football.192 Since Pugh 
redshirted his freshman year, he only had two years of 
eligibility left on his five-year clock,193 and he would need to 
 
 184. Id. 
 185. As a general rule, from the time a student-athlete enrolls in a four-year 
university, the athlete “shall not engage in more than four seasons of 
intercollegiate competition in any one sport.” NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, supra 
note 9, at 71, §12.8. Further, under §12.8.1 the athlete “shall complete his or her 
seasons of [athletic] participation within five calendar years from the beginning 
of the semester or quarter in which the student-athlete first registered for a 
minimum full-time program of studies in a collegiate institution.” Id. If any 
student-athlete decides not to participate in competition due to injury or is 
prevented from participating because he or she did not meet the necessary 
academic standards, the student-athlete will be considered a redshirt. See id. at 
73, §12.8.1.5.1.2. 
 186. 2010 Football Roster: Devin Pugh, WEBER STATE UNIV. 
http://www.weberstatesports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=8600&ATCL
ID=204959959 (last visited Mar. 18, 2017). 
 187. Id. 
 188. A redshirt sophomore is a student-athlete in his third year of enrollment. 
 189. Pugh, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132122, at *2–3. 
 190. In order to initiate the transfer process, a student-athlete must first 
receive a release from his current school that certifies the school has no objection 
to the student transferring institutions. NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 9, 
at 170, §14.5.5.2.10(d). 
 191. Pugh, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132122, at *3. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See NCAA, DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 9, at 71–72, §12.8.1. 
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compete immediately upon transferring to qualify for any of 
these offers. As a result, Pugh submitted a hardship waiver 
to the NCAA in the hopes of avoiding the Year in Residence 
Rule because the One-Time Transfer Exception, bylaw 
14.5.5.2.10, is not available to football players.194 The NCAA 
denied Pugh’s request, which prevented him from qualifying 
for any of the Division I offers.195 
Consequently, Pugh transferred to Division II Colorado 
State University-Pueblo where he was immediately eligible 
to compete because the One-Time Transfer Exception to the 
Year in Residence Rule does allow football players 
transferring from Division I to Division II schools to compete 
immediately.196 One major difference between Division I and 
Division II institutions, however, is their capacity to offer 
athletics aid to student-athletes.197 Though Pugh was 
immediately eligible to play at CSU-Pueblo, his scholarship 
only covered tuition, not books, housing, or any other costs of 
attendance he would have received at Weber State.198 As a 
result, Pugh increased his student loans from three thousand 
dollars per year to six thousand dollars per year for his 
remaining two undergraduate years.199 
2. Cause of Action 
Pugh brought a class action lawsuit against the NCAA 
in November 2015 alleging Bylaw 14.5.5.1 was an 
unreasonable restraint on trade that violated Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act by requiring transfers to sit out one year of 
competition before competing at a new school.200 In response, 
the NCAA filed a FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because 
 
 194. Pugh, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132122, at *3. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at *3–4. 
 197. See About NCAA Division II, supra note 28. 
 198. Pugh, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132122, at *4. 
 199. Id. 
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the Year in Residence Rule was previously deemed 
“presumptively procompetitive” by the Seventh Circuit in 
Agnew.201 
3. The Southern District of Indiana’s Decision 
Judge Pratt held that because the Year in Residence 
Rule was directly related to eligibility, it was “presumptively 
procompetitive” and Pugh’s antitrust challenge to the rule 
could be dismissed “in the twinkling of an eye” on the NCAA’s 
FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.202 First, citing language 
from both Agnew and Board of Regents, Judge Pratt 
recognized that while the Sherman Act “applies to NCAA 
regulations . . . ‘most regulatory controls of the NCAA are 
justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur 
athletic teams and therefore procompetitive because they 
enhance public interest in intercollegiate athletics.’”203 The 
judge again quoted Board of Regents for the pronouncement 
that collusion between teams in college football is acceptable: 
“when an NCAA bylaw is clearly meant to help maintain that 
‘revered tradition of amateurism in college sports’ or the 
‘preservation of the student-athlete in higher education,’ the 
bylaw will be presumed procompetitive, since the NCAA 
needs ‘ample latitude to play that role.’”204 
Pratt then examined what function of the bylaws Pugh 
was challenging. She determined that Pugh was challenging 
the legality of the eligibility section of the NCAA Division I 
Manual, because the Year in Residence Rule is an eligibility 
rule.205 Citing Agnew, Smith, and McCormack as authority, 
the decision found that all eligibility bylaws are 
 
 201. Id. at *7. 
 202. Id. at *9–11 (citing Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 341 (7th Cir. 2012)). 
 203. Pugh, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132122, at *10–11 (citing NCAA v. Board of 
Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984)). 
 204. Id. at *8 (citing Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117). 
 205. Id. 
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“presumptively procompetitive” under the Sherman Act.206 
Again citing Agnew, Judge Pratt found that because the rule 
was presumptively procompetitive, the court did not need to 
analyze the antitrust challenge any further and could 
properly dismiss it “in a twinkling of an eye.”207 
4. Analysis 
Judge Pratt relied heavily on Board of Regents and its 
Seventh Circuit reaffirmation in Agnew to grant the NCAA’s 
FRCP 12(b)(6) motion. Given the depth of Agnew’s analysis 
of the procompetitiveness of eligibility bylaws and the 
uncertain status of O’Bannon in September 2016, Pugh was 
an easy decision for the judge. Board of Regents and Agnew 
confirmed that the NCAA deserved the autonomy to set 
eligibility standards for its member institutions and their 
student-athletes to establish a level academic playing field 
for all participants in intercollegiate competition—the 
essence of Bylaw 14. 
B. Deppe v. NCAA 
Before Judge Pratt issued her decision in Pugh, Hagens 
Berman filed another complaint in the Southern District of 
Indiana in March 2016 on behalf of Peter Deppe,208 a punter 
at Northern Illinois University. The complaint contained the 
exact same allegations as Pugh and sought the same relief.209 
During oral argument at the district court level, both parties 
agreed that the factual allegations did not distinguish the 
 
 206. Id. at *9. 
 207. Id. at *9–10. Beyond the holding, Judge Pratt clarified an important point 
for future litigants: antitrust liability will only be proven by demonstrating that 
a bylaw lacks a procompetitive justification, not by showing economic harm to 
the plaintiff. Here, Devin Pugh’s increase to his student loans due to the Year in 
Residence Rule did not confer antitrust liability on the NCAA. Instead, the court 
looked at the character of the bylaw at issue. Id. at *10, *11. 
 208. Complaint at 1, Deppe v. NCAA, No. 1:16-cv-00528-TWP-DKL, 2017 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 31709 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2016) (hereinafter Deppe Complaint). 
 209. Id. 
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legal issues in Deppe from the legal issues in Pugh.210 
Instead, Deppe’s attorneys claimed Judge Pratt, again the 
presiding judge, applied Agnew incorrectly in Pugh and 
should find differently here.211 
1. Factual Background 
The facts in Deppe vary only slightly from Pugh. Peter 
Deppe was a very good high school punter and was extended 
preferred walk-on212 or full-scholarship offers from multiple 
FBS or FCS schools.213 He chose to become a preferred walk-
on at Northern Illinois University.214 At NIU, Deppe chose to 
redshirt his freshman year to retain his four years of 
eligibility because he was promised a scholarship by the 
Huskies’ then-special teams coach in August 2014, which 
would begin the following year in January 2015, when he 
would take over as the team’s starting punter.215 Yet, as in 
Pugh, Deppe’s special teams coach left NIU for another 
coaching job and the head coach informed the punter he 
would not be receiving the promised scholarship offer.216 NIU 
then signed another punter, which signaled that Deppe had 
 
 210. Deppe v. NCAA, No: 1:16-cv-00528-TWP-DKL, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
31709, at *9–10 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2017). 
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little chance to make the active roster and receive a 
scholarship.217 
Deppe requested his release, which NIU granted in 
September 2015, and began soliciting offers from other 
Division I schools.218 The University of Iowa offered Deppe a 
roster spot for the 2016–17 season if he could petition the 
NCAA to waive the year in residence requirement.219 Deppe’s 
parents called the NCAA to ask about transfer options and 
NCAA agents informed them that 14.5.5.1 mandated Peter 
sit out one year of competition.220 In response, on November 
11, 2015, Deppe’s attorney sent a letter to the NCAA to 
explain his client’s special circumstances, but upon review 
the NCAA discovered that Iowa had not submitted a year in 
residence waiver for the punter.221 Consequently, the NCAA 
was precluded from even considering waiving the year in 
residence until Iowa filed this request.222 On November 16, 
2015, Deppe was offered admission at the University of 
Iowa.223 Three days later, the Iowa coaching staff informed 
him that they would not file a waiver on his behalf because 
they had signed another punter who was immediately 
eligible for the 2016–17 season.224 
2. Causes of Action 
Peter Deppe filed a complaint in the Southern District of 
Indiana on March 8, 2016, asserting (1) that the NCAA’s cap 
on multi-year scholarships is unlawful and, (2) that the 
NCAA transfer rules violate the Sherman Act by restraining 
“players’ ability to make the best choices for themselves, 
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including ones based on financial considerations, academic 
considerations, athletics considerations, and personal 
circumstances.”225 This Comment only examines Deppe’s 
second claim for relief. In response, the NCAA filed a FRCP 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because 
Deppe’s suit against the NCAA was no different than Pugh, 
which was decided in the same court by the same judge just 
six months prior.226 
3. The Southern District’s Unsurprising Decision 
Wholly relying on her recent decision in Pugh, Judge 
Pratt again granted the NCAA’s motion to dismiss.227 The 
judge began her decision by confirming the issue in Deppe 
was “virtually identical” to the issue in Pugh: whether the 
Year in Residence rule is presumptively procompetitive.228 
As in Pugh, Judge Pratt quoted the Board of Regents dicta 
that “most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA are 
justifiable means of fostering competition . . . and therefore 
procompetitive”229 and that “when an NCAA bylaw is clearly 
meant to help maintain that revered tradition of amateurism 
in college sports or the preservation of the student-athlete in 
higher education, the bylaw will be presumed 
procompetitive, since we must give the NCAA ample latitude 
to play that role.”230 Judge Pratt then identified that the 
Year in Residence Rule was an eligibility bylaw, all of which 
were deemed presumptively procompetitive in Agnew and 
Pugh.231 As such, Pratt dismissed Deppe’s claim that Bylaw 
14.5.5.1 violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act on the NCAA’s 
FRCP 12(b)(6) “in the twinkling of an eye,” once again noting 
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that the issue did not need to be analyzed any further.232 
4. Analysis 
Pratt’s reasoning in Deppe was no different and 
justifiably shorter than Pugh, relying on the basic principle 
of stare decisis. She decided this exact legal issue six months 
earlier, and no cases from the Seventh Circuit or the 
Supreme Court dictated any reason to reverse course. 
C. The Aftermath of Pugh & Deppe 
Judge Pratt’s decisions in Pugh and Deppe were very 
straightforward analyses of the relevant legal standards 
applied to NCAA bylaws in Board of Regents and Agnew: 
eligibility bylaws are presumptively procompetitive, period. 
The timing of the Pugh decision is important, however. Pratt 
issued her decision in Pugh on September 30, 2016, just four 
days before the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
O’Bannon on October 3, 2016.233 
Judge Pratt made a calculated decision to adhere to 
Board of Regents when there was still a question of whether 
O’Bannon would be heard by the nation’s highest court.234 At 
the time, this was the safe holding because of the firm 
foundation Board of Regents stood on. The Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in O’Bannon was the first time the Board of Regents 
dicta was questioned by a federal court in a case against the 
NCAA. Moreover, it was still unclear whether this decision 
would be upheld by the Supreme Court, which both wrote 
Board of Regents and accepted four amicus briefs on behalf 
of the NCAA (and none from O’Bannon).235 Finally, the 
Seventh Circuit had recently reaffirmed the controlling 
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influence of Board of Regents in 2011 with Agnew,236 so Pratt 
had little reason to stray from the 1984 case’s long-held 
precepts. 
D. The Dangers of Pugh and Deppe 
If allowed to stand as held by Judge Pratt, Pugh and 
Deppe will set harmful precedents regarding the rights of 
student-athletes to challenge the NCAA under antitrust law 
when the organization’s model is justifiably in its most 
vulnerable state. Where O’Bannon should mark the 
beginning of an era of jurisprudence-defined bolstering of the 
rights of student-athletes, Pugh and Deppe could counteract 
or even stop this. So, in an era when the president of the 
NCAA has recognized his organization needs “fundamental 
change,”237 it is also time for the federal courts to rethink 
their stance on the amount of antitrust protection this 
broken model deserves. While Board of Regents and Agnew 
are controlling authority in the Seventh Circuit, these cases 
are also representative of the NCAA of the past. Accordingly, 
the Seventh Circuit has the opportunity recalibrate and do 
right by the student-athletes on appeal in Deppe the same 
way the Ninth Circuit did in O’Bannon. 
IV. THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF THE YEAR IN RESIDENCE RULE: 
VASSAR 
The Seventh Circuit’s forthcoming decision on the 
procompetitiveness of eligibility bylaws in Deppe238 is 
especially important for student-athletes like Johnnie 
Vassar, the lead plaintiff in the final challenge to the Year in 
Residence Rule in the Seventh Circuit. Vassar’s case, filed in 
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the Northern District of Illinois on November 14, 2016,239 is 
an example of the ends to which athletic departments will go 
to secure athletic success at the expense of its student-
athletes. The complaint set forth four causes of action, three 
against Vassar’s school, Northwestern,240 and one against 
the NCAA challenging the Year in Residence Rule.241 While 
Northwestern was directly responsible for a number of issues 
the freshman shooting guard encountered, the NCAA’s Year 
in Residence Rule accelerated the alleged harm to Vassar. As 
it stands, the parties have agreed to pause further action on 
the case because the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Deppe will 
likely determine the outcome of Vassar’s claim against the 
NCAA.242 
A. Factual Background 
Johnnie Vassar was a three-star point guard who was 
heavily recruited out of high school.243 After being recruited 
by a number of perennial March Madness contenders,244 
Vassar accepted a four-year scholarship to Northwestern, 
valid for the 2014–15 through 2017–18 academic years.245 
The young point guard committed to Northwestern based on 
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the quality of education and its proximity to his home in 
Chicago, where he would help care for a sick family 
member.246 
As a freshman, Johnnie Vassar played a limited role for 
the Wildcats under head coach, Chris Collins, averaging 3.9 
minutes/game (of 40 total), 0.8 points/game and shot 36.8% 
from the floor.247 At the end of the season, Vassar alleged he 
was “strongly and repeatedly urged” to transfer by his 
coaches so they could offer his scholarship to a different 
player the coaches felt would help the team.248 
In no uncertain terms, Vassar’s complaint alleges his 
Northwestern coaches had buyer’s remorse. At the time, the 
team had never made the NCAA Tournament in seventy-
eight years of competing in Division I, and there was huge 
pressure on Collins to end the streak—which he did in March 
2017.249 As a result, the complaint alleged the coaching staff 
undertook a series of forceful and deceptive measures to 
coerce Vassar to surrender his scholarship. 
According to the complaint, the coaches first asked 
Vassar to sign a “permission to contact” form, which allowed 
him to legally contact other schools regarding the potential 
for transferring, but then used Vassar’s request as a reason 
to remove him from the team roster.250 The coaches then 
forced him to sign a “roster deletion form” which 
acknowledged that he would be relinquishing any benefits 
student-athletes received, such as access to athletic facilities 
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and the training staff.251 Next, the school issued a press 
release that stated Vassar was transferring, even though he 
had neither asked for, nor had been granted a release.252 
The complaint stated that after receiving a transfer 
release he did not want, Vassar spoke with coaches from 
DePaul, Georgia Tech, Utah, and UNLV about the possibility 
of transferring.253 However, the schools all responded with 
the same message: if Vassar could waive the Year in 
Residence Rule, there was a scholarship available, and if not, 
tough luck.254 As a result, he chose to remain at 
Northwestern, where his full athletics scholarship was 
supposedly good for another three years. 
After he informed the Athletics Department he planned 
to remain at the school, Northwestern allegedly changed the 
nature of Vassar’s guaranteed four-year scholarship from a 
full grant-in-aid athletic award to a scholarship premised 
upon a work-study “internship” where he performed 
janitorial duties at the school’s athletic facilities.255 The 
school then allegedly offered Vassar a cash payment equal to 
the value of his scholarship in exchange for giving up this 
scholarship, which he declined.256 Next, the school’s 
attorneys issued an ultimatum to relinquish the athletic 
scholarship and receive a full-tuition academic scholarship 
or not relinquish and pay full tuition.257 Vassar refused the 
offer and the athletics’ department stripped him of his 
scholarship because he had not met his eight-hour per week 
work requirement under the internship program.258 
However, Vassar appealed the decision because the time 
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cards the department relied upon to cancel the scholarship 
were falsified.259 He won the appeal and kept his scholarship, 
but the university still changed the nature of his the 
financial aid to academic in May 2015.260 Vassar brought this 
lawsuit in November 2016.261 
B. Cause of Action 
For the final time in a less than thirteen month window, 
Hagens Berman, on behalf of Johnnie Vassar, asserted that 
the Year in Residence Rule injured a class of NCAA athletes, 
Division I basketball players, and thus violated Section 1 of 
the Sherman Act.262 The complaint defines the injury as 
follows: “[class] members’ choice of which NCAA Division I 
member institution to attend has been artificially restricted 
by the NCAA’s restrictions on their ability to transfer 
without loss of athletics eligibility.”263 Like in Pugh and 
Deppe, the NCAA filed a FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the 
cause of action for failure to state a claim because (1) the rule 
has been deemed presumptively procompetitive, (2) the rule 
is non-commercial, and (3) Vassar has not shown any injury 
to competition.264 
In November of 2017, Vassar and the NCAA agreed to 
put the case on hold until the Seventh Circuit rules on Deppe 
because the court’s decision on the antitrust claims will most 
likely dictate the outcome of the antitrust portion of Vassar’s 
suit.265 
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C. Why Deppe Matters That Much More 
If true, the allegations against Northwestern confirm 
why so many Americans have become skeptical of the NCAA 
and its most prominent athletic programs.266 Frankly, the 
system is failing its student-athletes, who are treated as 
disposable objects in coaches’ and institutions’ quests for 
athletic and financial success. When Vassar signed his NLI, 
the Northwestern basketball program committed to 
financing a four-year scholarship for him. Yet, after one year, 
Coach Collins changed his mind and allegedly resorted to a 
number of disturbing tactics to coerce Vassar to surrender 
his spot on the team and his financial aid. 
The coaches’ actions towards Vassar are equivalent to a 
professional team cutting one of its players. Yet, Johnnie 
Vassar was not a professional: he was an NCAA student-
athlete, who committed to Northwestern to play basketball 
and be the first person in his family to earn a college degree. 
To make matters worse, unlike a professional athlete, Vassar 
could not play at another school right away because of the 
Year in Residence Rule. 
While the NCAA did not directly commit these alleged 
harms to Vassar, it helped created a culture that fostered 
these actions by putting its own financial success ahead of 
the best interests of its student-athletes. In this case, ending 
Northwestern’s March Madness drought meant increased 
job security in a coveted Power Five head coaching position 
and a big contract for Coach Collins. In fact, after the 2017 
season—when Collins led the Wildcats to the Big Dance for 
the first time in program history—Northwestern rewarded 
the coach with a six-year contract extension worth over $3 
million per year.267 Yet to Collins, Vassar was an obstacle on 
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the way to a big payday, and he became expendable. 
As the NCAA’s revenues continue to grow, Johnnie 
Vassar will not be the only expendable student-athlete to a 
coach. As such, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Deppe is 
that much more important for transfers who have been 
unfortunate casualties of the Year in Residence rule. Where 
the bylaw supposedly protects eligibility, it has proven to 
victimize many student-athletes. Given the current state of 
the NCAA after the FBI investigation, the subsequent 
indictments and the UNC paper class scandal, these transfer 
cases should encourage the Seventh Circuit to take a fresh 
look at the eligibility bylaws to determine if they are 
functioning to “help maintain that ‘revered tradition of 
amateurism in college sports’ or the ‘preservation of the 
student-athlete in higher education.’”268 
V. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S CHANCE AT REDEMPTION: DEPPE 
Deppe269 presents the Seventh Circuit with the chance to 
scrutinize NCAA eligibility bylaws through a more practical 
lens if it is willing to recognize the current state of NCAA 
athletics. While the safest route the court could take is to 
affirm the district court’s dismissal because eligibility bylaws 
have been deemed “presumptively procompetitive” by Board 
of Regents270 and Agnew,271 this path ignores the current 
vulnerability of the NCAA after O’Bannon272 and the events 
of Fall 2017. Hence, this Comment advocates that the 
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Seventh Circuit should apply conventional pleading 
standards and the Rule of Reason to determine if the Year in 
Residence Rule violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
As opposed to dismissing Deppe’s suit “in the twinkling 
of an eye,” the court should first apply the Twomby and Iqbal 
plausibility pleading standard to determine whether the 
District Court’s grant of the NCAA’s FRCP 12(b)(6) motion 
was proper. If the court finds the grant was improper, the 
court should then analyze the Year in Residence Rule under 
the Rule of Reason. When applying the Rule of Reason, as 
O’Bannon recognizes, even if the NCAA can prove the bylaw 
is procompetitive, it is not “automatically lawful; a restraint 
that serves a procompetitive purpose can still be invalid 
under the Rule of Reason if a substantially less restrictive 
rule would further the same objectives equally well.”273 This 
Comment suggests a number of viable, less restrictive 
alternatives that help balance the needs of both the NCAA 
and its student-athletes. 
A. Procedural Standard: Twombly and Iqbal 
Where the district court applied the Agnew-endorsed 
“twinkling of an eye” standard from Board of Regents to 
dispose Deppe’s action on a FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, 
the Seventh Circuit should instead apply the plausibility 
standard set forth by Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal.274 Though the Seventh Circuit in Agnew adopted the 
Board of Regents “twinkling of an eye” standard275 for 
challenges to eligibility bylaws,276 in 2018, the effectiveness 
of certain eligibility bylaws should not fall under the 
umbrella of protection the Supreme Court envisioned over 
three decades ago. Instead of affirming the district court’s 
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grant of a FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “in the twinkling 
of an eye” simply because Deppe challenges an eligibility 
bylaw, the court should apply the Twombly and Iqbal 
plausibility standard. Thus, the court should first 
distinguish the facts from the legal conclusions made in 
Deppe’s motions.277 After striking the legal conclusions from 
the brief, the Seventh Circuit should determine, by using 
“judicial experience and common sense,” whether Deppe has 
made a plausible claim.278 No longer applying the blanket 
“twinkling of an eye standard” to all eligibility bylaws and in 
light of the current state of NCAA, the court should recognize 
that Deppe has made a plausible challenge and review this 
claim under the Rule of Reason. 
B. Applying the Rule of Reason 
As in Board of Regents and O’Bannon, the court should 
apply the Rule of Reason because some coordination between 
member institutions is imperative for the NCAA to 
operate.279 Rule of Reason cases are analyzed by a three-step 
process. First, the plaintiff must define the market and prove 
a “substantially adverse effect on competition.”280 Second, if 
the plaintiff successfully demonstrates negative effect on 
competition, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove the 
“procompetitive virtues” of its wrongful conduct.281 Finally, 
if the defendant shows a procompetitive purpose of the 
conduct, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that 
“the challenged conduct is not reasonably necessary to 
achieve the legitimate objectives or that those objectives can 
be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.”282 If 
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all three steps are met, it is up to the court to weigh the 
harms and benefits of the defendant’s conduct to determine 
whether this conduct is, in fact, reasonable.283 
1. Step 1: The Relevant Market & Substantially 
Adverse Effect on Competition 
Before analyzing the first step in the Rule of Reason, the 
plaintiff must define the relevant market. Here, Deppe’s 
attorneys identified “the nationwide market for labor of 
Division I football student-athletes” in the United States.284 
In this market, student-athletes compete for coveted roster 
spots on Division I football teams and the teams compete for 
student-athletes by offering certain in-kind benefits such as 
athletic scholarships, academic programs, and access to elite-
level coaching staffs and training facilities.285 
After the market is defined, the court will look to see 
whether Deppe has proven the Year in Residence Rule had a 
substantial impact on competition. Deppe contends that 
Bylaw 14.5.5.1 “functions as a penalty imposed upon 
Division I football players for switching schools [because 
without] the ability to play immediately, transferring 
student-athletes are less attractive prospects and therefore 
less likely to secure athletics grants-in aid from their new 
schools.”286 As a result, student-athletes who wish to transfer 
are awarded smaller scholarships than they would receive if 
they were immediately eligible to compete upon 
transferring.287 
The complaint then explores how coaches and players in 
the market would benefit without the rule: 
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[b]ut for this restraint, greater movement among Division I football 
players would inevitably occur. Players would seek out the team 
they most value, whether because of more playing time, a better 
relationship with the coaching staff, a change in the coaching staff 
that recruited the player, a better academic fit, or the availability of 
an athletics grant-in-aid on more favorable terms. Teams, in turn, 
would also seek out the players they most value. Free player 
movement would thus result in an optimal and most efficient 
matching of schools and players.288 
But, due to Bylaw 14.5.5.1, the NCAA restricts both the 
movement of players between teams in the market and the 
type of financial assistance transfer students may receive.289 
According to the complaint, but for the Year in Residence 
Rule, Deppe would have received a full scholarship at an FBS 
school. If he could play immediately, Deppe would have been 
able to field and accept grant in aid offers from Division I 
football teams, such as Iowa, who offered the punter a 
conditional spot on their team if he could waive the year in 
residence requirement.290 However, because the rule 
prevented his immediate eligibility upon transfer, Iowa 
found another punter who was immediately eligible to play. 
Consequently, the only way Deppe would have been able to 
play immediately after a transfer and receive scholarship 
money in the process was if he was willing to transfer to a 
lesser program at the Division II level.291 Yet, Peter Deppe 
was a Division I-caliber punter, who the Year of Residence 
rule kept out of competition. 
2. Step 2: The NCAA’s Rebuttal 
If the court finds that Deppe successfully proved the 
Year in Residence Rule has a substantially adverse effect on 
competition, the burden shifts to the NCAA to provide 
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evidence of the procompetitive virtues of its alleged wrongful 
conduct.292 The NCAA will likely point to two validations: (1) 
ensuring the academic success of student-athletes, and (2) 
preventing free agency in amateur athletics. 
a) Justification 1: Ensuring Success in a New Academic 
Setting 
The NCAA’s historical justification for its Year in 
Residence Rule has been that a year in residence at a new 
school helps student-athletes acclimate to the challenges of 
a new academic environment.293 First, the NCAA claims 
transfer students have historically struggled, so serving a 
full academic year in residence attempts to protect the role 
of the student-athlete in higher education by prioritizing 
academic success over athletics.294 In advising its student-
athletes on the transfer process, the NCAA publishes a guide 
entitled Transfer 101: Basic Information You Need to Know 
About Transferring to an NCAA College.295 The pamphlet 
frames the issue of transferring as an academics-first 
process: “to be a true student-athlete, you will need a basic 
academic foundation before you are eligible to play 
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sports. . . . And that is why you will need to be a successful 
student in the classroom before you can play at an NCAA 
school.”296 
Part of competing in NCAA athletics is being 
academically eligible—if an athlete cannot meet minimum 
standards in the classroom, the athlete cannot compete for 
the school. So, the NCAA would more than likely justify 
serving a full academic year in residence the same way: a 
year in residence is a way to make sure transfer student-
athletes will be capable of fulfilling academic eligibility 
requirements when they are permitted to compete.297 
b) Justification 2: Preventing Free Agency in Amateur 
Athletics 
Beyond academic justifications, Robert C. Berry and 
Glenn M. Wong assert that the NCAA’s transfer bylaws were 
written with two goals in mind: (1) to prevent other 
institutions from recruiting a student-athlete once the 
student-athlete is enrolled at his college or university, and 
(2) to prohibit a student-athlete from shopping around for a 
school that offers a better athletic opportunity or increases 
the prospect of reaching the professional level.298 The Year 
in Residence Rule is consistent with these two rationales 
because it deters student-athletes from using purely athletic 
motives to change schools by forcing transfers in revenue-
generating sports to sit out a year. The rule prohibits mid-
season and postseason transfers by students who find a more 
favorable athletic institution (e.g. if a student-athlete 
competes for one team during one semester, the student is 
prohibited from competing for another institution during the 
next). 
Ultimately, through its transfer rules, NCAA has 
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eliminated free agency in its most popular sports.299 Free 
agency is a professional sports concept where players can 
move between different teams after their contracts expire. At 
the end of their current contract, they shop the market of 
teams to determine what teams would be interested in 
signing them, and subsequently negotiate their own 
contracts. The Supreme Court noted in Board of Regents that 
the NCAA’s model is unique because its athletes are 
amateurs.300 
As the protector of the “revered tradition of amateurism 
in college sports,”301 free agency would be terrible for the 
NCAA’s optics. Amateur athletes should not be able to shop 
their athletics abilities to receive the most lucrative deal 
from a member institution, especially when the athlete is 
also required to complete a minimum course load at a college 
or university. In the most extreme scenario, if student-
athletes had the opportunity to transfer at will, an athlete 
could begin the season at one institution and end at another 
in the same academic semester. So, by effectively preventing 
free agency in college sports, the NCAA will argue the Year 
in Residence Rule should be deemed presumptively 
procompetitive because it attempts to keep the NCAA’s 
brand of amateur sports inherently amateur and its student-
athletes primarily students. 
3. Step 3: Deppe’s Rebuttal 
If the court finds the NCAA has met its burden of proving 
the procompetitive effects of the rule, Deppe must show that 
this restraint on competition is not reasonably necessary to 
the product or a less restrictive alternative is available. 
Deppe has a number of arguments he can make, especially 
with regard to proving less restrictive alternatives. 
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a) “Students First” Rebuttal 
One response to the NCAA’s academic eligibility 
justification is the argument that transfer students are 
students first and need to have time to, in fact, be students. 
If student-athletes are indeed students first, they should 
have the opportunity to find the best bachelor’s degree 
program possible.302 Yet, by restricting this freedom to move 
and choose the best school after entering college, the NCAA 
is closing off a section of the free market and engaging in 
anticompetitive action.303 
Both ordinary college students and student-athletes 
must meet certain academic requirements to be admitted by 
a transfer school. Yet when a non-athlete begins classes, the 
student’s extra-curricular organization cannot force the 
student to refrain from participating in the extra-curricular 
activity until after he completes a full academic year at the 
school.304 Why should student-athletes be subject to different 
standards if they are, in fact, students?305 
Furthermore, it seems clear that if a four-year college 
transfer is eligible to compete at his current institution, this 
student-athlete would be equally—if not better—prepared 
for life at a new university than an incoming freshman who 
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has never faced a college course load or a junior college 
transfer, both of whom can compete immediately upon 
enrolling at the Division I school.306 Division I football and 
basketball players may also compete immediately if they 
transfer from a Division I to a Division II or III program. 
Hopefully, the quality of the education remains the same 
when a student-athlete transfers from a Division I to a 
Division II or III program. If a student-athlete can be 
immediately eligible at a Division II or III school that offers 
a comparable education to a Division I school, why should the 
student-athlete have to sit out to adjust to academics at the 
Division I but not the Division II and III institution? 
Overall, the academic justifications of the Year in 
Residence Rule fall flat. A less restrictive alternative would 
be to use the NCAA’s academic eligibility standards, which 
are based on GPA and course load, to determine whether a 
student-athlete is ready for the academic challenge at a new 
institution.307 If the student-athlete is in good standing at his 
former university and academically eligible to compete, upon 
transferring to a new school, the student-athlete should be 
permitted to play right away. 
b) Free Agency Rebuttal 
As far as attacking the NCAA’s ability to prevent free 
agency, Deppe can make a number of arguments that prove 
free agency is not as damning for college sports as the NCAA 
believes it would be. Deppe’s lawyers would argue for a less 
restrictive alternative, controlled free agency, and its 
benefits. 
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i. Controlled Free Agency: The Less Restrictive 
Alternative 
First, it is important to clarify that free agency in the 
NCAA would not be a free-for-all. There is no doubt the 
NCAA would adopt legislation to set ground rules to control 
the free agent market to maintain the role of the student-
athlete in higher education. Put simply, student-athletes 
would not be able to transfer at will. First, to even qualify to 
transfer, student-athletes would have to meet certain 
academic eligibility benchmarks (e.g. be academically 
eligible at their current school). Second, the NCAA would 
limit transfer periods to a window after a championship 
season ends so players are not poached mid-season or during 
the semester. Finally, the rules would prohibit coaches from 
initiating contact with potential transfers. A student-athlete 
would first have to declare to his current school he wishes to 
transfer. After the current school certifies the student-
athlete is eligible to transfer, it will be the duty of the 
student-athlete to take ownership of the transfer and reach 
out to different programs. By forcing the student-athletes to 
make the first move, the entire transfer process will be 
controlled from the outset by the student-athlete, not the 
coaches. 
With these standard ground rules in place, the best 
alternative Deppe’s attorneys can suggest is to extend the 
one-time transfer option to all student-athletes. This 
alternative has currently been proposed by the NCAA 
Division I Committee on Transfers as a reform to be voted on 
for the 2018–19 academic year.308 This transfer option is 
currently available to NCAA Division I student athletes 
except those who participate in baseball, men’s and women’s 
basketball, football, and men’s ice hockey. In this scenario, 
all players get one free pass to change schools within their 
five-year eligibility clock, but do not have the unbridled 
ability to transfer at will. If Pugh, Deppe, and Vassar had 
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this option, none of these cases would exist because each 
student-athlete would have been able to transfer from their 
original institution. 
ii. The NCAA’s Concerns: Popularity and Playbooks 
So, while the NCAA may fear free agency in its model, 
and given the fact the NCAA is currently considering 
reforming the system, less restrictive alternatives such as 
extending the one-time transfer option are plausible because 
they offer the perfect compromise. The two major 
justifications for preventing free agency in college sports are 
popularity and playbooks. As for popularity, the NCAA is 
concerned it will be no different than professional leagues if 
student-athletes are free to transfer to whatever school they 
please, as many times as they wish. Yet, college athletics are 
not the pros specifically because the athletes are still 
students.309 When a regular student decides to transfer, it is 
often deemed a calculated life decision; so long as the 
student-athletes are not permitted to abuse the transfer 
process, via a one-time exception to the rule, it is likely fans 
would be receptive.310 
With respect to playbooks, coaches do have a legitimate 
concern about sacrificing competitive balance on opponents 
when a transfer student takes his playbook to the new school 
with him.311 Yet this is not a concern unique to the Year in 
Residence Rule or student-athletes. If a student-athlete 
transfers to a new program, the athlete does everything with 
the team short of competing. There is no rule prohibiting the 
player from sharing the previous school’s playbook with the 
new coaching staff, just as there is no rule prohibiting 
coaches who change universities from doing the same. A less 
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restrictive alternative would be a case-by-case determination 
on the amount of time an athlete must sit out. For instance, 
an athlete who transfers to a conference opponent may have 
to sit out a full year because of the frequency his former team 
competed against other teams in conference, while 
transferring to a close geographic rival might warrant only 
sitting against the former school in regular season 
competition.312 Students who transfer to lesser-connected 
schools may only be forced to sit out a certain number of 
games in a season, or wait a semester, rather than a full year, 
to compete.313 
iii. The Benefits of Controlled Free Agency 
Where the NCAA’s current transfer system clearly 
benefits coaches and institutions above players, a controlled 
free agency model would benefit the student-athletes as 
much as the other two groups. 
(1) Benefit 1: A One-Time Free Pass Accommodates the 
Athletes 
Professor Michael H. LeRoy argues that striking down 
the Year in Residence Rule “would make things [fairer] for 
players whose academic and athletic careers are shortened 
and made costlier by a new coach [and] would give players 
better options when a new coach wants to chase them off 
because they don’t fit his plans.”314 The professor’s argument 
gets to the crux of all three transfer lawsuits discussed in 
this Comment. Where coaches can move freely about the 
market to chase more prestigious coaching positions and 
huge contracts at the expense of the student-athletes without 
missing any coaching time, Division I football and basketball 
players are not given this luxury. Devin Pugh, Peter Deppe, 
and Johnnie Vassar were all recruited to their teams, and 
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signed National Letters of Intent with the intention of 
competing at that school for four years. They did not expect 
to be kicked to the curb before these four years were up, and 
were ultimately left behind because they did not fit into a 
certain coach’s plans. 
By enabling these young men to transfer, via a one-time 
exception to the Year in Residence Rule, or even a more 
liberal hardship waiver process, the NCAA could have 
avoided this transfer litigation entirely. An exception to the 
rule would have protected these student-athletes from the 
agendas of coaches, which consider student-athletes 
expendable. However, because the NCAA drew a hard line 
with its football and basketball transfer policies, it 
ultimately locked these student-athletes into troublesome 
situations. To make it worse, because schools would only sign 
these student-athletes if the NCAA would waive the year in 
residence requirement (which it did not), Pugh, Deppe, and 
Vassar were stuck. There was no reasonable alternative that 
offered a similar academic, athletic, and financial aid option 
that would not require compromising the opportunity to play 
at the Division I level. 
(2) Benefit 2: Controlled Free Agency Would Benefit the 
Market 
Beyond taking a more humane look at the transfer 
process, Professor LeRoy also believes a certain form of 
controlled free agency would benefit the market: 
A court ordered ban on the one-year transfer penalty and the 
scholarship cap would [] open a new market for players. High 
achieving players at a lower school could transfer to a stronger 
program to showcase their talents. Conversely, highly recruited 
players with disappointing careers could transfer down to a school 
to become a starter. Some might transfer to avoid a harsh or difficult 
coach, others might move for academic reasons, and still others 
might relocate for family or personal reasons. The market for 
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players would be more fluid—and probably, more disrupted.315 
Put simply, controlled free agency would allow student-
athletes to make an informed, calculated decision about their 
best interests without being penalized for making such a 
choice. As shown in Pugh, Deppe and Vassar, these decisions 
are not always motivated by the desire to use the NCAA as a 
steppingstone to a professional career. Devin Pugh wanted 
to transfer to continue playing football at the level he proved 
he could play while continuing to afford his education. Peter 
Deppe wanted to transfer so he could reach his goal of 
punting for a Division I team. Finally, though Johnnie 
Vassar did not want to leave Northwestern, an exception to 
the transfer rule could have prevented the alleged wrongs 
committed to him by his former coaches. By enabling 
student-athletes to transfer schools one time over the course 
of four years of eligibility, student-athletes can take 
advantage of a number of benefits the NCAA offers, whether 
it is academic, athletic, geographic or familial. 
c) Conclusion 
Given the three recent legal challenges to the NCAA’s 
transfer system and the conversations at the 2018 NCAA 
Convention among Division I institutions about extending 
the one-year transfer exception, the system is ripe for 
change. The Seventh Circuit should take all of this 
information into consideration to apply a true Rule of Reason 
analysis to the Year in Residence rule, which has negatively 
affected Peter Deppe among so many other student-athletes. 
If the NCAA is reportedly willing compromise on certain 
aspects of its current transfer bylaws, the court should also 
be willing to recognize that these archaic transfer bylaws no 
longer govern the NCAA as assessed in Board of Regents. 
Instead, the NCAA has grown to massive proportions and 
should be scrutinized under antitrust law as such. By 
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adopting a less restrictive alternative, the Seventh Circuit 
will help the NCAA maintain control of the transfer process, 
preserve the role of the student-athlete in higher education, 
and continue to field a successful, and practical, amateur 
sports model. 
CONCLUSION 
Devin Pugh, Peter Deppe, and Johnnie Vassar all earned 
the opportunity to do something very few athletes get the 
chance to do: play Division I athletics—the pinnacle of 
collegiate sports in the United States. Yet issues with 
coaches prevented them from competing for their schools for 
all four years of eligibility and each student-athlete was 
forced to chase his dream elsewhere. Pugh, Deppe, and 
Vassar all had spots on other teams—they were wanted 
players, but only if they could play right away. Neither 
injuries nor academic ineligibility prevented these young 
men from playing; they were physically capable and 
academically qualified to compete at the highest level in 
their sports. Instead, a bylaw justified by Supreme Court 
dicta from a thirty-four-year-old case with increasingly 
unstable precedential value enabled the NCAA to keep Devin 
Pugh, Peter Deppe, and Johnnie Vassar from competition. 
Where this bylaw sought to ensure these student-
athletes were amply prepared for the new academic 
environment at their potential transfer schools, Pugh, 
Deppe, and Vassar were all in good academic standing. 
Where the bylaw sought to prevent college sports from 
looking like the pros, none of these athletes sought to 
transfer schools because it would be a lucrative move for 
their athletic careers. Instead, they wished to transfer to 
either keep or be granted a scholarship to make the cost of 
their education more affordable and to continue to play in 
Division I. The beauty of the NCAA is the access to education 
it provides students who otherwise would not likely pursue a 
554 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
college degree.316 Johnnie Vassar was the first man in his 
family to attend college, but the Year in Residence Rule put 
his degree in jeopardy. 
After Judge Pratt issued her decision in Deppe, the 
NCAA’s Chief Legal Officer commented, “[it] is unfortunate 
that plaintiffs’ lawyers continue to file meritless lawsuits 
while ignoring multiple court decisions that uphold [the] 
NCAA transfer rule.”317 But in this quote lies the NCAA’s 
largest issue: its unwillingness to alter its approach to its 
athletes. All Peter Deppe was to the NCAA was another 
frivolous lawsuit, but the NCAA was everything Peter Deppe 
had worked for his entire life. Same as Devin Pugh. Same as 
Johnnie Vassar. The reports regarding changes to the 
transfer rules coming out of the 2018 NCAA Convention are 
the first signs that the NCAA has recognized its model needs 
to be adapted to the realities of today’s college sports. 
Continuing to view NCAA Bylaw 14.5.5.1 as 
presumptively procompetitive via the Board of Regents dicta 
is turning a blind eye to the evolution of amateur athletics in 
the United States and also to the personal needs of student-
athletes. The NCAA is earning money hand-over-fist, but 
depends on its student-athletes to drive its lucrative 
business model. The FBI investigation and indictments in 
Fall 2017 and February 2018 showed the inherent 
inconsistencies of today’s NCAA, and proved to be a step in 
the right direction for reclaiming student-athletes’ rights. 
O’Bannon was another step in making this model a little 
fairer for the young men and women who allow it to thrive. 
Future cases should follow its lead by no longer granting 
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NCAA bylaws the antitrust deference they have been given 
historically. Even the NCAA has realized that its transfer 
rules are archaic, and will reportedly vote to change them as 
early as Summer 2018. Regardless of the outcome of this 
vote, the NCAA must work to understand that its student-
athletes are not commodities. In the end, where the Year in 
Residence Rule may be black and white, the transfer cases 
for the student-athletes subject to it are not. 
